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ABSTRACT
Rent control has been a controversial issue in the Commonwealth for the
past two years. The purpose of this study has been to examine two hypotheses
concerning local rent control of a specific segment of the housing market, the
multifamily rental housing developments subsidized by the federal government for
low to moderate income families. The city of Boston has been chosen as a case
of a city which has attempted to alleviate a continuing shortage.of low-rent
housing with a program of local rent control over subsidized housing. The focus
of this report has been the housing built under Section 221(d)3 and Section 236.
Two hypotheses have been examined: 1) Local rent control discourages investment
in subsidized housing; and 2) local rent control contributes significantly to
financial instability and/or improper maintenance of subsidized housing. These
hypotheses were addressed in hopes of determining whether local rent control is
counterproductive to the goals of the federal programs.
The first section of this study deals with the contention that rent control
acts as a disincentive to construction of housing under the federal programs.
This section includes an investigation of incentives to investment in subsidized
housing--long term mortgage, reduced equity requirements, tax shelters, and
benefits from participation in subsidiary companies serving the development.
These incentives are unaffected by the existance of local rent control and are
sufficient to encourage investment in subsidized housing as can be seen by
an investigation of actual applications for mortgage loans in the years following
the institution of rent control in Boston. This investigation is included in
the first section.
The second section of this study centers around the factors contributing
to financial instability and improper maintenance of existing subsidized develop-
ments. There are numerous factors associated with financial and physical un-
soundness. The most signficant factors appear to occur during the development
phase where high debt service costs and latent defects in construction are pre-
determined. To determine whether rent control is a significant factor in financial
stability, it is necessary to consider not only the cost components of operation in
terms of the operation and development of subsidized housing, but also the
characteristics of developments now considered to be financially unstable--those
development which are in default, assignment and foreclosure. The second section
includes such an examination.
Finally, the procedures and practices of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development which regulates rents in subsidized housing are compared with
those procedures and practices of the Boston FHA Rent Control Board in the third
and fourth sections of this study.
The conclusion of this study is that local rent control is not counterproductive
to the goals of the federal programs but serves to complement the activities of HUD.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1968, the President's Committee on Urban Housing reported that 7.8
million American families, or one family out of eight, could not obtain decent
standard housing for less than 20% of their income. In addition, the committee
found that 10% of the nation's occupied housing stock (6.7 million units) was
substandard.1 These findings underscored a problem faced by a nation seeking
to guarantee a "decent home for every American family".2 The endemic shortage of
low-rent, standard housing has long been recognized as a serious problem. Histor-
ically, federal response to this need for housing has been intervention in the
private market. A primary means of intervention was established in 1961 when the
federal government began to subsidize the development of privately owned multi-
family rental housing. This program, Section 221(d)3, and the later 236 program,
subsidized the interest rates of mortgage loans and also insured these loans to
encourage construction or rehabilitation of housing for the low to moderate income
housing market.
State and local governments have also attempted to mitigate the housing
problem. Often, local government has attempted to deal with high rent levels
through direct regulation of the cost of housing through rent control. When rent
controls are imposed on housing built under the federally subsidized programs,
local government becomes involved in the federal sphere. Does local rent control
have a detrimental affect on federal programs which subsidize low to moderate
income housing?
To find an answer to this question, Boston was chosen as a case study of a
city attempting to alleviate its shortage of low-rent housing by controlling the
rents of federally subsidized housing. Two hypotheses have been examined:
1) Local rent control discourages investment in subsidized housing.
2) Local rent control contributes significantly to financial instability
and/or improper maintenance of subsidized housing.
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This study concludes that neither hypothesis can be proven with the data
gathered in this study. This review of the procedures, policies and mechanisms of
221(d) 3 and 236 housing at both federal (the Department of Housing and Urban
Development) and local (Boston FHA Rent Control Board) levels has shown the local
and federal schemes of rent regulation to be complementary.
Federal Intervention and the 221(d)3 and 236 Programs
Federal involvement in the housing market includes a wide range of programs
such as FHA insurance of single family and rental housing mortgage loans, grants
to local housing authorities for construction of public housing, regulation of
the capital money markets through the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, tax incentives
to real estate investors, direct subsidies to tenants as well as indirect interest
rate subsidies on mortgages for rehabilitation or construction of housing for
low to moderate income families by private enterprise.3 Generally, there has been
a trend away from direct federal participation in construction of public housing
to subsidization of private efforts.
In 1961, Congress passed the 221 BMIR (Below Market Interest Rate Program)
which began the federal policy of encouraging production of housing units for
low to moderate income tenants through private investment. This program was
extended in 1965 when the 221(d)3 program was established. Under both programs,
interest rates on mortgage loans were subsidized by the federal government.4 The
intent here was reduction of future amortization costs in order to lower the
rental income necessary for covering debt service costs. This subsidy would be
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an indirect one to low and moderate income tenants. The National Housing Act of 1968
extended this program of subsidized housing. Under Section 236, a deeper subsidy7
would allow for admission of lower income families to housing built with federal
subsidy.8 Sections 221(d)3 and 236 were further elaborated by the Tax Reform
Act of 1969, which authorized financial incentives to developers to encourage
participation in the programs. Both programs are administered by the Department
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of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) .
In 1973, a moratorium on appropriations to finance 236 housing was instituted;
the federal government has now moved in the direction of direct tenant rental
subsidies.9
It is clear that the intent of federal housing programs is to provide
housing that is satisfactory at a "price which does not limit a family's ability
to afford other goods and services, particularly other necessities". 10 The
primary objectives of these programs were stated in 1971 by the Federal District
Court in Langevin v. Chenago Court:
The complementary objectives of Congress, admittedly constitutional
and laudable, were to encourage private enterprise to undertake the
construction of housing for low and middle income and displaced
families, thereby dispensing with the rise of government funds for
equity investment and to see that an approgiate share of the benefits
of federal assistance went to the tenants.
Local Intervention and Rent Control of FHA Housing
States and localities also have long standing interest in the quality and
means of provision of housing. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the City
of Boston evidence such interest. Each has become involved in the regulation of
the quality of housing--through housing and building codes, zoning regulations,
sanitary and fire prevention codes-- as well as the provision of housing--through
such agencies as the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, the Boston Redevelopment
Authority, the Boston Housing Authority and the Department of Community Affairs.
In addition, certain state laws allow for regulation of conditions by permitting
tenants to withhold rent in situations where substantial code violations endangering
health and safety exist.
In 1969, Boston began a program of regulation of residential rents. Recognizing
that a significant portion of the rental housing market was composed of subsidized
housing, the city extended rent and eviction control to cover units built under
Sections 221(d)3 and 236 and occupied before December 1, 1968.12 After
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accepting the State Rent Control Enabling Act (Chapter 842 of the Acts of 1970)
to regulate residential rents in conventional housing, the City Council enacted
in December of 1972, a new ordinance under its special home rule provision (Chapter
797) specifically controlling 221(d)3 and 236 housing constructed before
January 1, 1972.13
The City Council action was based on its view that:
The deterioration and demolition of existing housing
and an insufficient supply of new housing...has resulted
in a substantial and critical shortage of sag, decent
and reasonably priced housing accomodations.
The stated objectives of both ordinances are to insure that 1) rents will not
be increased unreasonably and landlords will receive a fair net operating income
from housing accomodations, and 2) evictions would not produce serious threats
to public safety, health and general welfare of the citizens of Boston.15
The arguments against rent control over subsidized housing are similar to
those against conventional housing controls: namely, that rent control discourages
investment in subsidized housing and leads to financial instability and deteriorating
conditions in existing housing. In addition to these contentions,it is asserted that
local rent control of subsidized housing is superfluous, since rent levels and
housing conditions are already regulated by HUD. The existence of rent control on
the local level is said to add a costly second stage of red tape and delays in the
implementation of rent increases. This study addresses these contentions in the
sections that follow.
HYPOTHESIS I: RENT CONTROL DISCOURAGES INVESTMENT IN SUBSIDIZED HOUSING FOR LOW
TO MODERATE INCOME FAMILIES
This hypothesis can be tested by identifying the incentives to investment in
the low-income sector of the housing market and determining if rent control could,
in theory or does in fact, discourage investment in such housing. If the
primary incentive for such investment is the profit derived from rental income,
then rent control would be a hindrance to those who wish to pursue investment
in a low-risk venture with a high rate of return. Similarly, it could be concluded
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that rent control is a disincentive if, in a given community, investment in
such housing has actually decreased after the imposition of rent controls.
INCENTIVES TO INVESTMENT
In order to achieve the federal housing goals set forth in the 221(d)3 and
236 programs certain incentives were created to attract investment to construction
of new units or rehabilitation of existing units for low income families.1 These
incentives provide for benefits substantially greater than benefits from
investment in conventional housing. (See Chart 1). Among the incentives typically
linked with these programs are:
1) Federal guarantee of mortgages
2) Longer term mortgages with interest rate subsidy and a guaranteed
6% limited dividend on initial equity investment
3) Reduction of investor equity
4) Tax shelters
5) Participation in more than one phase of the development
A sample 236 development is analyzed in Appendix A to facilitate the following
descriptions.
Federal Guarantee of Mortgages
The federal mortgage insurance provisions of both subsidy programs reduce
the risk to the lender investing in subsidized housing. If a loss occurs, the
lender is repaid by the Federal National Mortgage Association with cash or govern-
ment bonds. This reduction of risk has broadened the mortgage market and number
of lenders willing to commit funds in this area; the greater availability of mort-
gage money in the area of multifamily rental housing makes the investment more
attractive to potential sponsors. In addition, the sponsor of subsidized housing
has no personal liability with an FHA insured mortgage. 2
Longer Term Mortgages with Interest Subsidy and Guaranteed Limited Dividend
Another incentive to investment in subsidized housing is the 40 year mortgage
allowed under these programs. Unlike conventional housing mortgages of shorter terms,
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the forty year mortgage allows for smaller monthly mortgage payments spread
out over a longer period. Combined with the interest rate subsidy by the
federal government, this provision lowers debt service payments in general,
an attractive prospect for the potential investor. 3 Risk to the investor is
further reduced by the guarantee of a yearly 6% return on initial cash investment
(equity) in a market usually characterized as high risk.
Reduced Equity Requirements
The initial equity required by the 221(d)3 and 236 programs is lower than
that of most conventional housing. The federal government permits a loan to
cost ratio of 90% for profit-making sponsors of subsidized housing whereas mortgages
for non-subsidized housing are typically only 75% of cost. 4 Thus the investor
must make an initial cash investment of only 10%. The benefit of this reduced
equity requirement to a potential investor is in the smaller amount of front
money needed to initiate a development. For the same amount of initial investment
capital, a sponsor can make a larger investment in a subsidized multifamily
rental housing development.
Not only does the high loan to value ratio of the FHA insured mortgage reduce
required equity,but actual equity paid by investors in 221(d)3 and 236 housing is
reduced through utilization of non-cash allowances, such as the Builder's and
Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance and/or markup in land valuation. Under FHA
regulations, the builder is guaranteed 6.75% of direct job costs for general over-
head and profit. However, if the builder and sponsor have an identity of interest,
the FHA programs guarantee them a Builder's and Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance
of 10% of actual construction costs as well as architectural and legal fees,
servicing and closing fees, real estate taxes during construction, plus the
builder/sponsor's own general costs. 6 The. BSPRA is an incentive to development
not only for its higher profit allowance, but also because the government permits
the developer to use this amount to offset the equity requirement. Builders
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and sponsors usually leave all or part of the BSPRA in the project as a credit
towards the 10% equity. Actual cash investment can be reduced to as little as
1.4% of the total cost of the development. (See Appendises A2 & A3).
Actual cash equity is further reduced by the FHA procedure of land valuation.
FHA uses the appraised value rather than the actual cost to the developer of
the land in calculating the replacement cost which is the basis for the
allowable mortgage. Often the appraised value is much higher than actual costs.
According to the U. S. Office of Audit in a report on 236 housing, HUD estimates
of land values made after sponsors acquired the land often exceed sponsor costs.
In 18% of the cases studies, FHA valuation procedures resulted in allowable land
costs ranging from 65% to 195% above actual investor acquisition costs. 8 The
advantage of this practice is that the developer/sponsor can apply the value
of land toward the required equity. This procedure can reduce the actual
cash investment in some cases to zero. The developer/sponsor may even receive
funds back from the mortgage when land value and BSPRA are used together to
offset the equity. (See Appendix A3).
It is important to note that once the mortgage amount is paid to the
sponsor, all costs are recovered so that a sponsor's contribution becomes at most
land acquisition costs. Although actual equity may be reduced to zero or less
through BSPRA and land markup, the developer/sponsor is still guaranteed a
6% profit on imputed equity. It is possible for the return on actual equity to
be significantly higher. ( In the appended example, A3, return on equity is infinite
in one case and close to 18% in the other.)
Tax Shelters
Tax laws provide a variety of tax shelters to investors in subsidized housing.
These tax shelters reduce federal income tax 1iability by allowing real property
owners to deduct expenses and decline in property value as losses which are
used to offset income earned from both real estate and other types of investment.
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Several features of the tax structure for subsidized multifamily housing allow
a greater return to subsidized housing investors than to investors in
commercial or conventional residential properties. These shelters are available
in three phases of the development--the construction phase, the operation phase,
and the distribution phase. 1
Construction Phase Tax Shelters
During construction of a development, a developer/sponsor is allowed to
write off certain expenses while at the same time receiving no income from the
property. Deductions include deductions for interest on construction loans, 2
real estate taxes, FHA examination and inspection fees and title and recording
fees. These deductions can be taken during the construction phase or can be
extended over several years3 and are allowed for both conventional and subsidized
housing development. Construction phase deductions are a benefit to investors in
that these deductions allow the investor to recoup expenses during construction
through sheltering other income. (See Appendix A4).
Operation Phase Tax Shelters: Accelerated Depreciation
The primary tax shelter incentive to investment is the accelerated depreciation
allowance. Depreciation is a non-cash expense allocation for a yearly decrease in
the value of real property, even though the value of the specific property may,
in fact, be increasing. This paper expense is treated as a loss of income for
tax puposes so that the same amount of revenue from other sources can be shielded
from taxation.
There are several methods of depreciation available to the investor in
subsidized housing, the most frequently used being the double-declining balance
method.4 This method permits the owner of a subsidized property to accelerate
depreciation expense so that the greatest deductions occur during the early
years of the development. 5 (See Appendises AS & A7).
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This tax shelter makes investment in subsidized housing more attractive
than investment in commercial or conventional residential properties in two
ways. First, the Tax Reform Act of 19696 which permits investors in 221(d)3 and
236 housing to use the double-declining or sum-of-the-years-digits methods, limits
the owners of commercial properties to the less rapid 150% declining balance
method and the owners of used residential properties to the 125% declining
balance method. (See Appendix B for a comparison of methods). Second, the ratio
of depreciation to imputed equity for subsidized housing is greater than that of
conventional housing--9:1 for federally subsidized housing and 3:1 for conventional
housing.7
This tax shelter is also significant in that the investor receives a
depreciation deduction on the total value of the property, not just the 10% or
reduced equity actually invested. In general, the importance of the accelerated
method is that it provides for increased working capital in the early years
of the development due to the small amortization payments (which are treated as
income for tax purposes)8 and large depreciation deductions. The shelter also
absorbs the 6% return on equity and creates a tax loss without reducing the
actual income of the development, in effect giving a tax free loan. (In the
appended example, the investor would be able to shelter over $100,000 of income
from other sources in addition to the 6% limited dividend in the first year of
operation through use of accelerated depreciation.)
Syndication Proceeds
Often the tax shelter benefits are too large to be used by a single developer/
sponsor, as the portion of losses that can be written off is greater than gains
elsewhere. In this case, many developer/sponsors find it advantageous to sell
tax shelters to other individuals (such as doctors, lawyers, etc.) who wish to
shelter their personal income. The developer/sponsor can "syndicate the
equity" by selling shares of the development, typically 12 to 18% of the replace-
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ment cost of the development.9 They create a limited partnership which includes
both general and limited partners who are entitled to a share of the 6% limited
dividend as well as the tax shelter benefits.10  (See Appendix A9).
Although this procedure is called "syndication of equity", in fact, there
are no requirements that the developer/sponsor use proceeds from the partnership
as contribution to equity. In cases where actual equity is reduced below 10%
through use of BSPRA and land markup, the proceeds are a profit to the developer/
sponsor.11  (See Appendix A10).
Operation Phase Tax Shelters: Five Year Write-off on Rehabilitation
Those developer/sponsors who invest in the rehabilitation aspects of the
221(d)3 and 236 programs are allowed to use straight-line depreciation over a
five year period for up to $15,000 per unit on improvements made. This 20% per
year write-off is attractive because it allows investors to receive benefits
in the early years of operation.
Distribution Phase Tax Shelters: Capital Gains and Special Treatment of Recapture
In the event that the developer/sponsor wishes to sell the property at a
later date, taxes must be paid on the excess above depreciation received from
the sale.12 However, for investment in subsidized housing this excess above
depreciation is not taxed at the ordinary income tax rate, but at capital gains
rate which is one half of the ordinary income tax rate.13 Even so a
certain portion of capitals must be treated as ordinary income if the property
is sold in the early years of the development. 1 4 Even so, the benefits to investors
in federally subsidized housing are large. According to a study on Tax Considerations
in Multifamily Housing:
Even that portion of the depreciation which is subject to
recapture at ordinary income tax rates is beneficial to
the investor. If the investor can make full use of the
tax losses generated by accelerated depreciation, they will
result in additional tax savings during the early years which
can be reinvested. Even if all accelerated depreciation is
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later recaptured, the use of additional cash saved in taxes is
tantamount to interest free loans. 15
In addition, tax provisions relating to recapture give the investor
in subsidized housing an advantage over investors in conventional housing
in that there is no recapture after ownership of the property for 10 years
for subsidized housing as opposed to 16 years for conventional housing. There
is no reduction in tax on recapture for commercial properties.
Distribution Phase Tax Shelters: Deferment of Taxable Income Through Reinvestment
The investor can avoid capital gains tax altogether if proceeds from
sale of a subsidized property are reinvested in another FHA subsidized housing
developmenat. If the sponsor performs this "roll-over", he can receive benefits
from accelerated depreciation in the early years of ownership, sell the
subsidized property and reinvest in a second 221(d)3 or 236 property without
being subject to any tax.16
Summary of Tax Shelter Benefits and Reduced Equity
The primary incentive for investors is profit. The reduced equity and
tax shelter opportunities of the federally subsidized housing for low to moderate
income families provides for substantial profits on project equity. Analysis
of the sample 236 development (Appendix A) shows that after 21 years of owner-
ship, a developer/sponsor in the 50% tax bracket17 can receive an internal rate
of return18 on investment of over 100% when all methods of tax calculation
discussed above are taken into account. Thus, a developer/sponsor who invests
approximately $60,000 or 1.4% of the replacement cost of the development as
initial equity, can receive a syndication return of $320,500 after taxes. (See
Appendix A10). With retention of interest in the development in the form of
a limited partnership this return can be increased. In a similiar analysis,
James Wallace has found that internal rate of return on investment approached
190% for a rehabilitated 236 project and 100% for a new 236 development when
page 12
ownership was retained for 12 years.19 (See Chart 2). A comparable analysis
indicates that 50% tax bracket investors holding shaiesof $50,000 each in a
development with a $5 million mortgage receive a 22.1% rate of return over the
first 23 years of ownership. After 16 years, the rate of return is 20.1%; after
ten years, it is 12.8%.20
Tax shelter benefits are decided incentives to investment in federally
subsidized housing. Return to both developer/sponsors and limited partners is
substantial. Benefits are greatest for each type of investor in the early years
of the development; the first four years for the developer/sponsor who does
not retain interest in the development, the first ten years for the limited
partner. These benefits are high when contrasted with average returns on compar-
21
able short term investment which fluctuates around 9%. Analysis of benefits
of tax shelters also shows that the incentives are significantly greater than the
apparent 6% limited dividend. Although this 6% return on equity is included in
the tax analysis, it should be noted that even greater rate of return would occur
if no cash distributions were made, as every dollar of cash not distributed adds
50 cents to a 50% tax bracket investor's tax savings. Thus not only is return
from tax shelters great, it has little relationship to the rental income producing
ability of the development.
Benefits from Participation in More than One Phase of Project Construction and
Operation
In addition to the identity of interest between sponsor and builder in
the initial phases of the construction of the development, it is also permissible
for sponsors to take part in other phases of the project. It is possible for the
investor to increase profits from the development by contracting with firms in which
an interest is held. The following are types of subsidiary companies: accounting
firms, maintainance equipment rental companies, management companies, building
supplies companies, security companies, architectural and engineering firms and
cable TV services. The owner can, in effect, convert expenses of operation into
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income from these enterprises. By owning more than one development, the owner
can realize some economies of scale and assure continuing demand for subsidiary
services, assuring continuing financial success.
Federally subsidized housing programs include incentives to private
investors to become involved in development of low to moderate income housing that
result in large investment benefits to those who choose to invest in these
programs. The major benefits can be realized through reduced equity requirements,
tax shelter benefits and participation in more than one phase of operation of
the development. Theoretically, then, rent control, which affects only the
operational phase, is not a disincentive to investment as it does not affect
the most attractive features of investment in federally subsidized housing.
Whether, in fact, investors perceive these as major incentives to their invest-
ment in subsidized housing and whether this is reflected in actual application
trends on a practical level, can be seen by an assessment of the Boston case
in the section that follows.
THE EFFECT OF RENT CONTROL ON ACTUAL INVESTMENT IN FHA SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
Data of two types were analyzed in attempting to understand the
influence of rent control on investment in federally subsidized housing in
Boston. The first source of information was from developers involved in
housing built under Sections 221(d)3 and 236 in Boston and other areas of
Massachusetts. A series of interviews with nine major developers was conducted
in the summer of 1974. Second, data was obtained from the Department of Housing
and Urban Development on applications for 221(d)3 and 236 mortgage loans in
the Boston area for the time period of 1962-1972.
The interviews were conducted in an attempt to determine what incentives
investors in subsidized housing perceived to be most signficant in their
decisions to invest in housing catering to the low-to-moderate income market,
specifically under the 221(d)3 and 236 programs. The developers were selected
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based on their active participation in these programs. The interviews were open-
ended; interviewees were invited to comment on the extent of their involvement
in subsidized housing, experience with the development process, reasons for
investment, financial difficulties in operation of their development and pro-
blems in working with either HUD or the Boston Rent Control Board.
Of the eight profit-making developers interviewed, six indicated that tax
shelters, specifically the accelerated depreciation benefits, were the most
significant factor in their investment decision. One stated that the 6% limited
dividend was the major incentive, but that his firm utilized the depreciation as
a corporate tax shelter. Two of the first six also cited secondary reasons
for investment, those being profit potential in related housing services and
a desire to further social progress in the housing field. (See Appendix C).
In theory, rent control cannot affect what investors perceive as the main
reason for their particiaption in these programs. However, actual decisions often
vary from an investor's espoused reasons for action. While the Boston area
developers interviewed were attracted to FHA subsidized housing as investment
opportunities, did they and/or other investors continue to invest in such housing
after Boston's rent control ordinance was enacted? To determine the practical
affect of rent control on new investment in low to moderate income subsidized
housing, the application rates for the three year period before the enactment of
rent control, 1967 through 1969 are compared with those rates for the three years
after the institution of rent control, 1970 through 1972. Although some data
for 1973 is available, its usefulness is doubtful due to the moratorium on new
236 commitments declared in January, 1973. The annual change in units for
which mortgage applications are made is examined to establish the impact of
rent control on investment decisions. Mortgage loan amount figures are not
examined due to the difficulty of determining a standard of comparability in
times of inflationary building costs. 2
The hypothesis being tested is that rent control of subsidized housing is
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a disincentive to new investment in the subsidized programs. Given this hypothesis,
it would be anticipated that the unit application rate for Boston would decline
steadily beginning in 1970 and would remain at a substantially lower level than
for years prior to 1970. An inspection of the data show that the hypothesis is
not supported.
Total units applied for in the three year period before rent control
exceeded units applied for in the three years after rent control by about
1,000 units. The bulk of that loss occured in 1971; however, there is a
200% increase over 1971 in units applied for in 1972. (See Chart 3 and
Tables 1 & 2).
The high number of units applied for in 1970 and especially in 1972 negate
the hypothesis, especially if there are sound reasons other than imposition of
rent control to explain the 1971 drop. Indeed, the 1971 drop can be explained by
several other factors which had particular influence on the subsidized housing
market in Boston at that time. Since the HUD data gives no indication of what
these factors were, interviews to obtain information on the 1971 situation
were conducted with personnel both at HUD and the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency. Information from these interviews and an analysis of mortgage market
trends in 1970 and 1971 suggest the following reasons for the 1971 decline in
applications.
In 1971, the Boston HUD office was in the process of being converted
from an FHA insuring outlet to an Area Office. Previously, all subsidized
multifamily projects had been supervised from the Area Office located in New York.
The transition of personnel and records began in 1970, but the office did not
become operational until well into 1971. During the interim period, processing
of applications was seriously disrupted; fewer applications were registered
than might have been the case had the office been fully operational during the
whole period.
The downturn in applications during 1970 and 1971 can also be understood
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TABLE 1
MORTGAGE LOAN GUARANTEES APPLIED FOR IN BOSTON
Units per year
Year 221(d)3 236 Totals Percent
Change
New Rehab New Rehab
1962 -- 22 -- -- 22
1963 1,022 106 -- -- 1,128
1964 1,353 -- 381 -- 1734
1965 462 123 -- -- 585
1966 1,031 218 -- --
1967 313 1,933 128 282 2,656
1968 380 174 700 226 1,480 -44%
1969 212 497 1,492 1,138 3,339 +124%
1970 195 -- 1,796 964 2,955 -11%
1971 -- -- 403 430 833 -72%
1972 -- -- 1,130 1,557 2,687 +222%
1973 No figures applicable
TABLE 2
MORTGAGE LOAN GUARANTEES APPLIED FOR IN BOSTON
Aggregate Dollars per year
Year 221(d)3 236 Totals
196) $120 00 -- $120 000
13,127,333
19,644,705
8,859, 100
21,529,040
28,493,600
11,687,600
12,161,200
7,853,600
8,046,700
8,740,200
24,831,500
52,204,603
60,507,256
16,119,500
62,308,410
13,127,333
27,691,405
8,859,100
21,529,040
37,233,800
36,519,100
64,365,853
68,360,856
16,119,500
62,308,410
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
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in terms of fluctuations in the capital markets at that time. During 1969,
1970 and early 1971, general bank credit was restricted;3 interest rates on
mortgages rose to over 8%. High interest rates appear to have no direct effect on
new investment in subsidized housing due to federal subsidy and insurance.
However, despite lowered interest rates, the supply of mortgage funds was limited
at that time due to the financial policies followed by commercial banks--the
primary lenders of multifamily subsidized mortgage and construction loans. In a
period of restricted total bank credit, commercial banks shift assets to invest-
ment in short term ventures in order to retain sufficient liquidity to cover
demand deposits.4 These short term investments also tend to yield higher returns.
Net aquistion of long term residential mortgages, especially the large 40-year
221(d)3 and 236 loans, is curtailed.
This was the situation in 1970 and early 1971.5 It was not until after
wage and price controls in August of 1971 that there was an easing of the credit
situation, freeing funds and encouraging further development of rental housing
units. The trend of mortgage applications closely follows a pattern predicated
on available bank credit as the primary factor in housing investment. 6
Another important factor in the decline of FHA mortgage applications during
this time period was the increasingly active role of the Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency.7  Although the MHFA was created by legislation in 1966 (amended in
1968), it was not until 1969 that the courts upheld the constitutionality of the
Agency. In 1970, the first year in which it was fully operational, the MHFA
received applications proposing 18,000 units of subsidized housing, utilizing an
MHFA appropriation of about one million dollars in FHA 236 funds. In 1971, MHFA
received 169 applications proposing a total of 45,000 new units and appropriated
2 1/2 million dollars in FHA 236 funds. For.Boston in 1970, 1370 units in 13
developments were applied for and eventually approved. In 1971, 16 developments
(1226 units) were applied for that were eventually committed. 8
Among the features that attracted developers to MHFA were 1) its program
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included marketable units of mixed income developments--thus creating more stable
rent rolls and 2) quicker processing of applications. A study of the MFA
development process at this time revealed the following:
MHFA's closer association with the immediate neighborhoods,
housing problems and community needs in the Commonwealth
produces a reaction of speedy response in processing of
housing development proposals. At MIHFA, mortgage loans are
processed within an optimum period of three months. That
this fast operation of mortgage loan aprrovals fosters a
reduction of the overall production cost of housing can be
based on present economics. FHA's processing time has
an optimum of 24 months, principally caused by the fact that
decisions to provide mortgage loans are made in FHA's head
office in Washington.9
In addition, the MILFA program was not affected by availability of mortgage funds;
projects were financed through sale of short term bonds rather than through
funds obta 4 ned in the normal mortgage market.
Another factor influencing the decline in 1971 was a reservation to the
Boston Redevelopment Authority of an additional one million dollars of FHA 236
funds for units to be developed under the Boston infill housing program. This
reservation was held until the end of 1972. This effectively discouraged
other applicants knowing that funds were otherwise committed.
Thus the draw-off of FHA appropriations by the MHFA and the BRA combined
with complications of establishing the new area office made FHA 236 mortgages
difficult to obtain in 1971. In 1972, the area office was operating at full effic-
iency; MHFA, faced with a backlog of applications, became more selective. In
that year, MHFA had only two developments in Boston (172 units) applied for and
committed, while FHA applications rose almost to 1970 levels. 10
These are the factors--administrative inaccessibility, a new state program,
unavailability of mortgage funds, pre-existing reservations fo funds--which
explain the 1971 slump in FHA applications. It is possible that some real estate
investors may have held back applications furing this period in order to assess the
effects of rent control on the existing stock. If so the jump in applications in
1972 would seem to indicate the restoration of confidence in FHA subsidized housing
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development in Boston. Overall, given the expressed motivations for investment
and the information on applications, there appears to be no direct relationship
between imposition of rent controls and new investment in subsidized housing
in Boston. Rather, fluctuations in investment during the study period are
explainable by other factors. Therefore, hypothesis one is not supported by
the Boston evidence.
HYPOTHESIS II: LOCAL RENT CONTROL CONTRIBUTES SIGNIFICANTLY TO FINANCIAL
INSTABILITY AND/OR IMPROPER MAINTENANCE OF SUBSIDIZED HOUSING
In addition to the argument that rent control inhibits new construction
of housing for low to moderate income families, it is also contended that rent
control is a significant factor contributing to financial instability and
improper maintenance. Rent control on the local level is said to create these
conditions in two ways. First, local rent control boards, by denying rent
increases limit the rent producing ability of the development. Second, by
delay through a lengthy second stage of "red tape", the development loses money
that could be used to offset income loss.
The result is twofold. First, due to reduced income through a ceiling on
rents or a delay in approval of increases, as expenses rise not all of the obligations
of the development can be met. The development is then considered financially
unstable and may be forced to default on mortgage payments. The second result is
that with limited income, the owner will be forced to reduce expenditures on
discretionary costs, typically maintenance, leading to deterioration of the
physical quality of the development.
The hypothesis can be tested first by an examination of the complex and
interrelated factors involved in the financial and physical "health" of the
subsidized housing development--the cost components of operation and the effect
of the development process on the ability of the development to cover these
costs. If the primary reasons for default and undermaintenance are due to
uncontrollable rising expense in the face of limited income, the existance of
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rent control on the local level would be in question.
Second, a conclusion about the influence of rent control on the financial
stability of subsidized developments could be reached by an analysis of the
developments in Boston that are in either default, assignment or foreclosure,
categories which are indicators of financial instability. If the developments
in these categories are predominately under rent control, then rent control
can be said to have a significant affect on the financial stability of subsidized
multifamily housing.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE HEALTH OF THE DEVELOPMENT
Operation Phase in General: Cost Components of Operation
The cost components of operation affect the amount of available income to
cover mortgage and maintenance expenditures. Some of these costs are fixed and
remain at a constant level throughout the life of the project--debt service,
reserve for replacement payments, management fee percentage. Other costs are
variable--insurance, taxes, amintenance and repairs, utilities, bad debts,
vacancies. Of those cost components that are variable, some are externally
determined and out of the control of the manager of the development; others
are linked to good management practices.
Utilities. Gas, oil, electricity, water and sewer costs have increased substan-
tially in the last several years.2 The price of utilities is beyond control of
the owner. However, there are conditions existing in developments that may
contribute to the size of these expenses--poor insulation, construction or
design defects, lack of incentive to tenants to conserve use of utilities, ineffic-
ient use of common electricity.
Taxes. In Boston, owners of federally subsidized housing either have a
"gentlemen's agreement" with the city that tax assessment be a percentage of
gross income or they are covered by state law which exempts subsidized housing
from property taxes and requires that they pay a percentage of gross receipts in
lieu of taxes. 3 Although the percentage paid in taxes is a fixed cost and
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relatively stable, at least for the owners under the "gentlemen's agreement", the
percentage is subject to change. The reliance of local government on the
property tax for revenue makes developments vulnerable to increased costs of
operation. In 1972, the percentage of gross income as taxes rose from 15%
to 17%.
Insurance. This item is especially significant for rehabilitated developments.
These developments are primarily located in the inner city of Boston and are viewed
by insurance companies as high risk. Owners are thus forced to resort to
the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plan in order to get coverage
for their development. This FAIR plan is nearly twice as costly as conventional
insurance.4 This is a factor over which owners have little control although some
"shopping" can result in cost savings.
Maintenance and repairs. These expenses include routine maintenance--extermination,
grounds cleaning, normal service calls, repainting vacant apartments, freeing
clogged drains, etc. as well as extreme repairs--remedying sewer back-ups and
floods, etc. Some of this maintenance work is done by maintenance personnel;
more extensive repairs to plumbing and electrical systems often are performed
by outside contractors.
Although there may be increases in these expenses due to increases in the
costs of labor and parts, in general,this expense category is highly variable,
subject to management decision. Unnecessary maintenance expenditures are sometimes
intentionally caused by the owner of the development. Rental equipment, charged
yearly to the development, has in some cases been rented to the project by
subsidiaries of the owner at rates sufficient to purchase equipment twice over.5
Inefficiency in performing maintenance can also increase costs due to management
practices in hiring maintenance personnel. A high turnover in janitorial workers
may contribute to higher maintenance costs.
Often increases in repair and maintenance costs are due to the quality of
construction. Defects in construction can cause recurring maintenance problems.6
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Often increases in repair and maintenance costs are due to the quality of
construction. Defects in construction can cause recurring maintenance problems.6
This will be discussed more fully in the latter portions of this study. What-
ever the externalities, maintenance is the one cost component over which develop-
ment owners/managers have substantial control.
Bad Debts. There may be bad debts associated with the development due to
tenant characteristics. Often real or available income has been reduced
after the tenant's admission to the development for a variety of reasons: unemploy-
ment, family break-ups, inflationary increases in other consumer goods. At
the same time that income is reduced, rent increases make rental payment more
difficult.
A second reason for bad debt losses is mismanagement. The effect of poor
construction and greater operation and maintenance expenses have converged and
resulted in poor management-tenant relations and rent strikes in some developments.
Bad debts are a highly variable income loss component.
vacancies. There are three major factors which influence the vacancy rate;
failure by the developer to adequately assess marketability of units in the
particular location of the development; rent levels beyong the tenants' ability
to pay; and undermaintenance which according to Michael Stegman "increases the
,,7possibility of loss of income through vacancies" . The vacancy loss thus varies
from development to development and in some instances is tied to management of the
project.
Management Fees. The management fee for developments in the Boston area is a
fixed 4-6% of the project gross rent collections. The management fee expense
increases only upon the increase in rents. This has the effect of giving an
incentive to management to increase costs, thereby increasing rental income
and thus increasing the dollar amount of the management fee. Rather than giving
an incentive for efficient management and proper maintenance, the fixed percentage
arrangement encourages management to look for increases in the previously
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mentioned cost components in order to justify rent increases.
Overall, these cost components--utilities, taxes, insurance, maintenance
and repairs, bad debts, vacancies and management fees are marginal. Some are
subject to improvement by good management, others are external to the develop-
ment. It is clear that at least some of these components--maintenance and repairs,
bad debts, vacancies and debt service payments (still to be discussed)--are
highly dependent on the general quality of the development which is predetermined
during the development state of the federally subsidized project. The major
cost component of operation is debt service which is also set during the
development stage§ It is important, then to examine the development process
itself in order to identify other factors which contribute to financial difficulties
and physical deterioration of subsidized properties during operation.
Development Process of 221(d)3 and 236 Housing
During the development process of federally subsidized housing built under
the 221(d)3 and 236 programs, three situations occur as a result of practices
and procedures of HUD and the developer which contribute to the inability of
developments to cover expenses upon the opening of those housing units: 1) the
mortgage amount is inflated, ultimately resulting in higher debt service costs;
2) the original operating expenses are underestimated, resulting in greater
than expected costs upon actual operation; 3) construction defects occur which
later lead to increased maintenance and repairs expenditures and income loss through
bad debts and vacancies.
A study of 36 developments in the Boston SMSA done by the Boston
Urban Observatory for the Boston Redevelopment Authority and National League of
Cities shows that "financial problems correlate both with increasing expense during
the development process and the underestimation of operating costs".1 Both
of these practices will be examined as they appear in the feasibility, construction
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and final closing phases of the development process.2
During the feasibility stage of the development process, the potential
sponsor must submit a formal application for mortgage commitment proposing
construction of a subsidized development to HUD for approval. In order to
demonstrate that the proposed development is "feasible", the developer must
show that the project will be able to cover all operating expenses and debt
service costs once it is in full operation. These expenses must be covered
by rental income; however, due to the nature of the 221(d)3 and 236 programs,
there is an upper limit on rentals that can be charged once the development
goes into operation. These maximum rent levels are based on income limitations
on admission to federally subsidized housing. For a 221(d)3 development,
initial rent for each apartment cannot be more than 20% of the income of a
family earning the maximum income allowed under the eligibility standards. For
a 236 development, initial rents cannot be more than 25% of the adjusted maximum
income of future tenants.
These maximum rent levels put a limit on total potential rental income
that can be generated by a development. This limit in turn restricts the
amount of money available for debt service and operating expenses, thus placing
a ceiling on the size of the mortgage that can be granted and the amount of
the total replacement cost. The mortgage may also be limited by statutory
per unit cost limits and statutory total project ceiling costs. In general
if the estimated total replacement cost of the development is within 2% of the
debt service limit, the project cannot be considered economically feasible.
Since HUD will never allow a mortgage over the maximum. mottgage amount supported
by the project's net income, the developer/sponsor has three options in cal-
culating total replacement cost that would be considered feasible:
1. The sponsor can invest at higher equity levels while main-
taining a mortgage that meets the mortgage limitations.
2. The sponsor can cut the cost of construction of the project.
3. The sponsor can lower projected operating expenses.
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In general,the sponsor will not take the first option. As investment in sub-
sidized housing is made for the largest return, the sponsor will avoid having to
contribute more equity than is necessary.3
The second option is a possibility for some sponsors, but for those devel-
oper/sponsors with an identity of interest or those developers who syndicate
equity, this would also not be a wise investment decision. The Builder's and
Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance is based on a percentage of construction
costs. The depreciable basis of the property and architectural and legal fees are
based on a percentage of the replacement cost of the development. A large re-
placement cost due to higher construction costs will generate a greater return for
the developer and future limited partner investors. The larger the replacement
costs, the greater tax losses as a result of larger depreciation deductions,
and the higher the rate the limited partner would pay to a sponsor for a share of
the equity. James Wallace has found that the mortgage amount is the most significant
parameter in determining tax benefits.4
If the development costs are not decreased, then the sponsor must take the
third option to meet the feasibility requirement; the operating expense project-
ions must be underestimated. An underestimation of $100 per unit per year in
operating expenses will enable the mortgage to be increased by $3,300 per unit.5
The immediate effect of this calculation is not felt by the project until it is
completed, at which time income must cover actual operating expenses. Once
the development is occupied, actual operating expenses exceed original estimates.
The rent levels based on those estimates will be insufficient to cover increased
costs.
There is substantial evidence to show that the third option is the one
most widely chosen by the sponsors of subsidized developments. According to the
Boston Urban Observatory assessment of developments in the Boston area:
Every project in the study sample started out with severe cost
overruns. Operation cost overruns in the first full year of
operation ranged from $97 per unit per year to $600 pe unit per
year, 117% of the projected operating expenses figure.
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This practice was also found to be wide-spread nationally. The Office of
Audit report on 236 development concluded that there was a constant pattern of
underestimation of project operating expenses. At one HUD insuring office,
underestimation of project operating expenses lead to default for several develop-
ments. Outdated and incomplete data at HUD insuring offices has resulted in in-
accurate assessment of projected expenses. In addition, the production of as
many units as possible was overemphasized, with the necessary data gathering not
being performed in many cases.7 Thus, the terms built into the program for
maximizing construction costs coupled with the attitude of the HUD field offices
has resulted in the underestimation of expenses, leading in turn to financial
difficulties of operation.
During the construction stage of the development process, situations may
occur which further inflate the mortgage. At this point in the process, there
may be reasons for modification of the original specifications of the proposed
development. Any changes which would increase the cost of the development,
change the design, or reduce the construction costs by more than 2% of the pro-
jected construction costs must be approved by HUD and must constitute "equivalents
necessities or betterments". 8 These "change orders" may increase the size
of the mortgage by increasing costs of construction.
While some change orders are clearly necessary, others are approved in
order to meet FHA minimum property standards and local building and fire pre-
vention codes.9 These changes are not what one would ordinarily consider
necessary changes in that they are required to have been in the original speci-
fications of the development. Typically, instead of pursuing a negligence claim
on the liability insurance that FHA requires of the architect, the developer
proposes and HUD approves change orders to cover those items. A former consult-
ing engineer for FHA reported that he was not aware of a single instance where
the architect was held financially accountable for design deficiencies covered
by change orders. 10
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Even approved change orders that do not increase the mortgage amount often
result in construction delays which increase costs. When construction is
delayed interest and property taxes must be paid during the delay period, thus
inflating the final replacement cost of the development and the mortgage amount.
The Boston Urban Observatory found that high cost developments tended to
have more and larger change orders; eleven of the twelve high cost developments
in the study exhibited financial difficulty. Of the remaining developments, none
with change orders amounting to increases of more than $80 per unit escaped finan-
cial difficulty.12
It is during construction that failure to detect construction defects which
later lead to increasedoperation expenses occurs. FHA inspection personnel are
required to visit the project to review the work of the architect and to inspect
construction. Many times, these inspectors have failed to report deficiencies
that exist.13  In one development, inspection reports did not acknowledge
inadequacy of the heating system which became evident only one momth after
occupancy when tenants reported lack of heat. 14 In another Boston
area development, repair and maintenance expenses of over $50,000 resulted
from repairs made to a defective sewer system. The system was ordered removed
by the local board of health two months after the final mortgage commitment was
made; it was replaced through a FHA loan which had to be paid back through
rental income over and above the original mortgage amortization.15 Thus
FHA inspections often do not serve as an incentive to good construction. Bonding
requirements also provide no incentive for quality as HUD and the sponsor rarely
take advantage of this insurance. 16
In the concluding stage of the development process--final closing and cost
certification--HUD practices allow for further inflation of the mortgage. Where
there is an identity of interest between sponsor and one or more contractors or
subcontractors, cost certifications are required from both mortgagor and contractor.
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HUD must then review certifications to determine the reasonableness of the
amounts indicated which ultimately determines the mortgage amount allowed.
1 7
At this point, HUD has the authority to declare the project infeasible. In
the past, HUD has failed to carry out its responsibilities in this area.
First, cost certifications have not been completed in some cases. In one instance
involving a Boston area developer, HUD found that the developer/owner failed to
certify costs amounting to 1.8 million dollars almost five years after the develop-
ment was in operation. 18 At the time of final closing, these costs were
included as part of the basis for the mortgage. In other cases, inadequate cost
certifications were made. Of the 52 finally endorsed developments studied by
the Office of Audit, 21 had inadequate cost certifications resulting in about
$344,000 ineligible and $281,000 questionable costs. 19 Insufficient scrutiny and
laxness on the part of HUD, then allow the owner to "slip in" uncertified
costs which can only serve to inflate the mortgage and subsequent debt service
payments.
Finally, once the development is constructed, HUD is reluctant to declare
the project infeasible and deny the permanent mortgage and interest subsidy to
the developer/sponsor. If it is found at the time of final closing that the
replacement cost has inflated to such a degree that required mortgage payments
and projected expenses necessitate rental levels above the income limits of
the locaility, final closing will be postponed until an increase in income limit-
20
ations makes the development feasible. The reason for this practice can again be
explained by HUD's overriding emphasis on production of units.
As a result of the nature of the development process and practices on the
part of HUD and the developer/sponsor, mortgage amounts may be inflated,
operating expenses underestimated and construction defects undetected. This
leads to financial difficulty in the operation and maintenance of developments
built under the 221(d)3 and 236 programs. With inflated mortgages, all operating
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expenses cannot be covered due to large debt service. Due to construction defects,
extraordinary expenditures have to be made for maintenance and repairs. Ex-
penses of operation that are greater than those originally projected may nec-
essitate rental increases; thus, the burden of expenses necessitated by the
sponsor's practices and HUD's failure to monitor various stages in the develop-
ment must be passed on to the occupants of the development.
Development and Operation Phases: Tax Benefits
The previously mentioned practices of HUD and developers can cause sub-
sidized developments to be vulnerable to financial instability. Probably the
most important pointto be made about the development process, however, is that
the tax shelter provisions provide no incentive for maintenance of the financial
or physical health of the developments built under the 221(d)3 and 236 programs.
The tax shelters which were intended as an incentive to production provide no
incentive to proper operation on the part of the owner because 1) these benefits
are reaped in the early years of the life of the development21 and 2) there
is no requirement that returns from the tax benefits or syndication proceeds
be related to successful operation of the development.
As previously discussed in the section on incentives to investment,
the benefits from tax shelters occur prior to and during the first four years
of operation for the developer who syndicates equity and the first ten years for
the limited partners. Consequently:
Although it [tax shelter] provides very substantial benefits for
developers and sponsors of the projects, these benefits are most-
ly obtained before the projects are occupied, and in no case are
they tied to the successful operation of projects; so long as
they manage to avoid being foreclosed.. .developers and sponsors
continue receiving benefits regardless of the scope or quality
of services to the tenants. 2 2
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The primary determinants of financial stability and proper maintenance
occur in the development process stages when debt service is set based on inflated
replacement costs and when construction defects and underestimated operating
expenses lay the foundation for future overruns in operational expenditures. Costs
of operation may contribute somewhat to operational difficulties, but many of
these costs are within the control of management. In addition, the incentives
established to encourage development of subsidized housing, while allowing for
substantial benefits to the investor, provide no incentives or funds for proper
maintenance of subsidized developments. These are some of the factors which
contribute to the financial and physical conditions of many subsidized developments.
Rent control, which affects only the operational aspects of subsidized housing,
can have no effect on those factors established during the development process
which are the basis of many problems in operation. It remains to be seen in
the actual Boston case whether rent control significantly affects the financial
stability and proper maintenance of subsidized multifamily hsouing. Examin-
ation of the indicators of financial instability--default, assignment, and
foreclosure--in relation to rent control would indicate the importance of
rent control as a contributory factor in financial and physical deterioration
of housing built under the 221(d)3 and 236 programs. This kind of assessment
will be made in the sections that follow.
THE EFFECT OF RENT CONTROL ON DEFAULT, ASSIGNMENT AND FORECLOSURE OF FHA
SUBSIDIZED DEVELOPMENTS
Opponents of local rent control of subsidized housing have contended that
rent control is a significant factor contributing to financial instability of
existing developments. The Department of Housing and Urban Development also
appears to take this position with its issuacne of a regulation exempting
FHA subisidized developments from local rent controls. In the preface to this
regulation, HUD states that:
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The Department is aware that there are many factors which
contribute to mortgage defaults and does not consider local
rent control as the sole factor, but rather as a signficant
factor in causing owners of FHA projects, especially sub-
sidized projects to default on their mortgages.
The primary indicator of financial instability used by HUD has been the
default rate. Two categories of project status are also appropriate indicators of
financial instability: assignment and foreclosure. Developments in all three
categories have been examined for the purposes of this study.
Using the default rate as an indicator of financial instability, Boston
seems to have faired badly. At the end of January, 1975, 434 of 6,244 (7%)
FHA subsidized developments were in default.3 Boston, with 1.9% of the nation's
subsidized housing, had 3.9% of the defaults; thirteen percent of Boston subsidized
developments were in default.4 However, it is unclear whether the default rate
can be used as a valid indicator of financial stability. Default status is
a monthly determination. It is a transient measure in that one development may
remain in default for several months depending on HUD's willingness to cure
the default by granting a mortgage modification. This type of measure reveals
little of the degree of seriousness in financial instability of the developments.
It is even more difficult to reach the conclusion on the basis of this
information that rent control has contributed significantly to default. For
example, in August of 1975, HUD regional offices had nine Boston developments
in default, eight of which were under rent control. In October, there were
three developments in default, only one of these was under rent control. 5
Finally, there is no evidence that rent control is significantly cor-
related with default nationally. Although no extensive study has been done by
HUD relating default with rent control, a survey by one HUD official of some
846 developments in default from July to October of 1973 showed that only .2%
of the developers surveyed indicated that one of the reasons for default of
their developments was rent control. No information was given as to what pro-
portion of the developments surveyed was actually under rent control.6 Other
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factors contributing to default noted by one HUD official are economic
depression, local jurisdiction increasing its tax base or deciding to withhold
tax abatements, vandalism, tenant rent strikes and non-profit sponsors part-
icipating more in the subsidized programs. 7
Two other indicators have been used to assess financial instability. The
first, assignment, is the next step in the process of foreclosure in which
mortgages formerly held by the Federal National Mortgage Association are
assigned to HUD which then becomes the mortgagee. In 1974, 265 mortgages were
assigned to HUD nationally with 11.9% of those being Boston developments. 8
Because assignment is a more firm indicator than default and because HUD's
decision to assign represents a more definite statement of financial instability,
it is important to make an indepth analysis of the composition of the assigned
developments. For this purpose, the Boston assigned FHA subsidized developments
listed as of September, 1975,9 were compared with a list of those developments
under rent control. 1 0 (See Table 3, Section #2).
Of the 102 221(d)3rand 236 developments in Boston, 49 were assigned to HUD;
all but two of these developments were assigned after January 1, 1973. Ten
of these developments were exempt from rent control.Seventeen had registered
with the Boston Rent Control Board but had not approached the board for rent
increases from the time of registration trhough February of 1975. Thirteen had
received 100% approval of increases that the owners had requested before the
Rent Board from 1973 to February, 1975. Information was not available on four
developments covered by rent control. Only five developments had not received
full approval of requested increases but had received some percentage of their
request. In effect,only 10% of the developments in assignment may be said to
have been adversely affected in terms of financial stability by rent control.
Further examination of these assigned developments indicates that there may be
other factors which more centrally explain assignment.
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TABLE #3
ANALYSIS OF THE ASSIGNED PROPERTIES IN BOSTON *
1. By Program Assigned Not Assigned
221(d)3 40 (57% of 221d3) 29 (43% of 221d3)
236 9 (27% of 236) 24 (73% of 236)
Total 49 53
Percent of
total 48% 52%
Subtotal
69
33
102
Percent of
Column #1
68%
32%
100%
2. Rent Control Status--Developments
Exempt 10 (20% of
assigned)
Registered only 17 (35% of ,
assigned)
100% Rent Board 13 (26% of
approval assigned)
Less than 100% 5 (10% of
approval assigned)
No information,
but covered
22 (42% of non-
assigned)
31 (58% of non-
assigned)
4
3. Rent Control Status--Units
Exempt 1,312
Covered 3,301
Total 4,613
4. BURP Projects 16
5. By Sponsor
Non-profit 17 (50% of NP)
Limited dividend 32 (49% of LD)
Co-op --
Unknown --
3,182
4,368
7,550
2 (foreclosed)
17 (50% of NP)
33 (51% of LD)
2
1
*As of September, 1975.
32
70
13
31%
69%
13%
5 5%
4 4%
4,494
7,669
12,163
37%
63%
18
34
65
2
1
33%
64%
2%
.9%
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First, Boston is unique in that much of the subsidized housing in the
city (2300 units) is concentrated in the inner city as a result of the Boston
Rehabilitation Project (BURP). This program was undertaken by the federal
government in 1966 as a showcase for the nation of the speed--eight months--
and efficiency with which subsidized housing could be rehabilitated.
Two extensive studies, An Evaluation of the Boston Rehabilitation Program
by Urban Planning Aidil and the Boston Rehabilitation Program by Professor
Langley Keyes,12 revealed the problems inherent in the program. As a result
of attempts to streamline the 221(d)3 program operations, detailed specifications
were not required and FHA inspectors failed to extensively monitor the program.
Consequently, cost-cutting measures were taken by developers, including the
use of substandard materials; construction was of poor quality. This lead
to rapid deterioration and consumer rejection of the units, increased heating and
maintenance bills, and high vacancy rates. Another problem associated with
the program was that large mortgages were used to cover many scattered units,
multiplying the effects of financial instability of relatively few units.
Compounding these problems was the location of the units in innner city areas
where there is difficulty in rent collection and maintenance as well as high
insurance rates. The defects of this program are evident in the number of
BURP units in assignment. Of the 18 developments rehabilitated under the
BURP program in Boston, 16% have been assigned. (See Table 3, Section 4).
A second characteristic of the assigned developments is developer related.
Seventeen of the assigned developments (35%) are owned by the same developer/
owner/manager, indicating that assignment may have been due in part to poor
management on the part of this owner.13
Equally significant, seventeen of the developments in assigned status
are owned by non-profit sponsors. According to the Boston Urban Observatory,
non-profit sponsors that went into the development of subsidized housing
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brought with them a certain naivete about the development process. There was
a greater tendency for non-profit developments to be subject to construction
defects as well as increased mortgages due to construction delay and large
change orders.14 As a result, increased expenses due to large mortgage payments
and higher repair and maintenance bills, as well as an unsophisticated approach
to managementmay have lead to financial difficulty.
The final indicator of financial instability is foreclosure. As of
September, 1975, one 236 and seven 221(d)3 developments have been foreclosed
in the city of Boston. Data are unavailable as to rent control coverage of
two of these developments; two did not register with the rent board. The re-
maining four were registered with the rent board; however, data are unavailable
concerning approval of their rent increase requests. Composition of these
developments resembles those assigned in that seven of the developments are
rehabs; two of the foreclosed developments are the remaining two BURP
developments mentioned earlier.
It appears that there is not sufficient evidence to indicate that there
is a causal relationship between rent control and financial instability as
measured by default, assignment or foreclosure which are indicators of
financial stability. Rather there are other factors which explain adverse
financial status, especially assignment--rehabilitation of housing units under
the BURP program, mismanagement by one large owner of subsidized housing,
and non-profit participation in development of 221(d)3 and 236 housing. In
addition, an analysis of the complex factors which contribute to deterioration
and unsound developments shows that many of the problems encountered in operation
can be traced to the development phase. The importance of these other factors
is that they indicate the complexity and range of characteristics which
are involved in considering hypothesis two. One factor, rent control, cannot
be viewed in isolation.
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THE DUAL ROLE OF HUD
As the administering agent of the 221(d)3 and 236 programs, HUD is res-
ponsible not only for guaranteeing production of housing units,but also for
regulating and monitoring the operation of subsidized developments so that the
mandate of Congress--decent housing at reasonable cost for low to moderate
income tenants--is fulfilled. HUD fulfills this obligation through rent
regulation, monitoring of conditions of the developments and approval of
distribution of limited dividends. Those regulatory functions, it has been
argued, obviate the need for local rent control. However, HUD must play another
role--that of mortgage insuring agent which has the effect of committing the
agency more centrally to the financial rather than physical health of the
development. This vested financial interest determines HUD policy and biases
rent regulation so that factors considered in rent increase decisions "are
directed in substantial part to the protection of HUD security interest". Thus,
judged by the standards of the Congressional mandate, many of the HUD mechan-
isms for rent regulation are inadequate. HUD's role as enforcer of social
policy gives way to its role as banker.
HUD regulations require that HUD approve all rent increases in subsidized
developments before the owner can collect additional rent. The size of
the increase approved is to be sufficient to insure a "reasonable return on
investment to the owner consitent with providing reasonable rentals to
tenants". The HUD Insured Properties Management Guide states that:
HUD will entertain a written request for a rent increase
for any new increases in taxes and operating expenses
over which the owners have no effective control.
The mortgagor should carefully consider the local conditions
to determine if a rent increase will alow the project to
remain competitive...and must also be certain that all un-
necessary expenses are reduced to a minimum.2
In the past, however, the emphasized phrases of the above paragraphs
have gone unheeded, essentially because HUD has "insinuated itself into a
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position of interdependence"3 with the owners of subsidized housing developments.
As mortgage insurer, in the event of chronic default and substantial financial
difficulty, HUD is obligated to foreclose on the development that it insures and
must then repay the balance of the mortgage to the mortgagee. HUD's reluctance
to retain ownership of these subsidized developments is understandable in light
of the fact that in the past the loss to HUD upon resale of foreclosed 221(d)3
developments was approximately 45% of the acquisition costs.4 In order to avoid
the possibility of foreclosure, HUD has maintained financial stability as its
primary consideration. In the words of the director of the HUD Area Office
for Massachusetts, "HUD's role is the business end of it. We've got so much
federal money invested in these projects that we've got to protect the federal
investment".5 He went on to say that federal money must be protected even if it
means that low and moderate income tenants will be forced to move out of the
developments.
In practice, HUD's choice of the role of mortgage insurer over that of
administrator guaranteeing quality housing at reduced rents and in the early
years, HUD's emphasis on production are reflected in the procedures and mechanisms
for regulation of rents and conditions. These procedures are inadequate to fulfill-
ing the goals of the programs in the following ways.
HUD's procedures, mechanisms and formulas are characterized by:
1) Insufficient scrutiny of financial information
2) Formulas weighted in favor of manager and/or owner
3) Failure to monitor conditions and quality of the development
4) Failure to consider financial harship of tenants
5) No effective allowance of tenant participation in rent increase decisions.
Insufficient Scrutiny of Financial Information
When an owner of a subsidized development wishes to increase rents, he/she
must submit a financial statement of profit and loss (2410) to the Area Office
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which then processes that request. In the past, the HUD staff assigned to
handle rent increase applications has been inadequate to the volume of
applications. In 1971 and 1972, one staff member was responsbilbe for rent
increase processing for the Area's 150 subsidized developments. Although
the staff has recently been expanded, it is recognized by HUD and others that
there is still not enough personnel to properly assess rent increase applic-
ations. 6
Proper assessment also depends on the basis for assessment--the finan-
cial information submitted by the owner. HUD requires only an audited statement
by a certified public accountant. No other substantiation is deemed
necessary. According to Fred Phaender, director of the Loan Management Divi-
sion of the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Washington, the
area office is "not expected to audit those figures. He accepts those figures
off of the CPA's certification, but then he makes a determination of their
reasonableness as opposed to verifying them which would in my accountant's
,,7
mind would call for an audit".
In accepting audited statements which organize financial information in
a highly aggregated form without further investigation, HUD has often
approved rent increases based on unnecessary expenses. In several instances
confirmed by an Office of Audit report, HUD has allowed inclusion of double-
counted management fees, double-counted maintenance rental and repair expenses
among several developments owned by the same developer, as well as excessively
high legal fees and expenses for repairs necessitated by construction defects
that could have been covered through seeking compensation from the contractor.
At the same time, HUD failed to include certain items--application fees,
repair fees paid by tenants, late rent fees--as income for the developments
in question.8 In general, according to the Boston Urban Observatory,
The HUD staff usually reviewed rent applications cursorily and
seldom questioned or analyzed the data given to justify a rent
increase.. .Without the time or inclination to monitor..requests
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carefully, HUD staff approved inappropriate rent increases,
causing tenants to pay more rent than was warranted under HUD's
own guidelines.
If the field office has a reason to suspect the expenses listed in the
financial statement, an audit can be requested from the central office. How-
ever, a recent study by the comptroller general has shown that in Chicago,
Atlanta and San Francisco the HUD Area and Insuring Offices did not promptly
tell program participants about the Office of Audit's findings and did not
obtain agreements on what would be done to correct deficiencies. There
was no adequate follow-up on program participants to insure that corrective
actions were being carried out.10 The report concluded also that:
BUD officials were not taking full advantage of results of HUD
audits of program participant activities. Instead of using
these audits as a means of correcting reported problems, HUD 11
officials assigned a low priority to clearing audit findings.
If audit findings were used by HUD perhaps errors in approving unjustified
expenses as a basis for rent increases would be corrected.
Formula Bias
The HUD formula for determining the necessity of rent increases is
weighted in favor of the developer/owner and/or managing agent and does not
take into account actual expenses incurred in four areas. First, HUD allows
a standard percentage of gross income--4-6% of gross rent collections--as
a management fee. This fee does not include salary for an on-site manager
or managing assistant which is allowed as a separate expense.12 The straight
percentage often does not reflect the actual expense of management of the
development, especially in cases where the management company, usually a
subsidiary of the owner, manages several developments at greater cost efficiency
due to economies of scale--a situation typical of Boston. 1 3
Second, the HUD formula allows a 7% vacancy rate which can be deducted
from gross potential income of the development in justifying a rent increase.
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This vacancy factor greatly overestimates the actual vacancy in the Boston
area where the average vacancy rate for subsidized housing developments is
1.7%. 14
HUD also allows the full amount of capital expenditures to be claimed in
one year as repair expense when often the investment has a life of several
years. Finally, the HUD formula does not allow for inclusion of tax abatements
received in previous years as a part of the income of the development. In
Boston, the abatement is standard as developments are taxed on the basis of
17% of gross income.15
In addition to the four areas where HUD allows either overestimated
expenses or underestimated income, the HUD formula is also biased against the
tenant in situations where there is commercial space that is part of the
property through inclusion in the mortgage. In several developments that have
commercial space tenants must bear the burden of mortgage payments for
those areas in the event of high commercial vacancies.
Failure to Monitor Conditions and Quality of the Development
According to HUD guidelines, "the Housing Management Division Director
has the responsibility for seeing that annual maintenance inspections are
made of all multifamily projects under his jurisdiction and further, that such
inspections are thorough as well as factual".16 It is suggested that properties
be inspected prior to the date of application for rent increases if the last
annual inspection report is not recent. 7 However, in many cases inspections are
inferior and perfunctory with increases being approved without current inspect-
ions.1 8 There is no minimum number of units that must be inspected.
Where thorough inspections are made citing that immediate attention or
maintenance is required within one year, there is often no follow-up and the
same citations are made the following year. 1 9  In one Boston development,
inspection reports for three consecutive years cited that maintenance was
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required within one year for exterior walls and foundation cracks, lack of
fire escapes and sunken roads in disrepair.20
Insufficient monitoring is evidenced in the poor condition of many of
the subsidized developments. In one development, also in the Boston area,
inspection by a community health worker disclosed leaks in 191 or 225 apartments,
sinking ground level floors, inefficient and inadequate heating systems and
insufficient and inferior laundry facilities. In another development built
by the same builder, a wall collapsed two months after completion of con-
struction.21
HUD officials themselves admit that the Area Office is lax in performing
and following up on inspections. Inspectors are not instructed to enforce
the laws HUD requires owners to follow. 2 2 Forms are sometimes signed without
conforming to HUD rules. 2 3
Even when thorough inspections are done, there are no standards for in-
corporating findings contained in inspection reports into the rent increase
approval process. Although the HUD Insured Properties Servicing Handbook does
suggest that HUD may deny rental increases if matters requiring maintenance
24
or immediate repairs are cited in the physical inspection report, there
is no requirement that this be done.
Tenant Hardship
Aside from requirements that the rent level for apartments at initial
occupancy be no more than 25% of the maximum income limits of the area, there is
no HUD requirement that rents be kept at levels which are within the means of
low or moderate income tenants residing in those development. In fact,
owners are encouraged to apply for rent increases after the opening of the
development and at least every two years thereafter.25 There are also no
provisions in the HUD regulations for rent decreases or tenant requests for
rent reduction, further indicating that HUD is primarily interested in rent in-
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creases.
The Boston Urban Observatory indicates, however, that many tenants
living in federally subsidized housing in the Boston area could not afford the
burden of additional rent increases. According to their survey, the median
annual income of families in subsidized housing is $5,300. More than 1/3
of the households have no wage earners and thus no potential increase in
income to pay future increases in rents. 26
Lack of Tenant Participation in Rent Increase Decisions
New HUD regulations issued in October, 1974,27 require that developers
post notice in their buildings informing tenants that an increase application
is being made to HUD. Tenants then are allowed to view the landlord's
financial statement and have 30 days to submit comments to the landlord which
then must be included in the landlord's statement to HUD. Although this regu-
lation allows more tenant participation than formerly accepted, it does not
provide sufficient opportunity for tenants to question the rent increase
application. First, because figures on the financial statement are aggregated,
it is difficult for tenants to challenge the owner's statement on the basis of
their knowledge of specific expenditures. Second, this procedure does not
provide for a second chance for tenants to challenge any additional information
presented to HUD by the owner after the initial application is made and the
audited statement is submitted.
Finally, as with the inspection reports, there are no standards for
dealing with the comments made by tenants vis a vis the approval or dis-
approval of rent increases. It has been the past experience of tenants
who have been to HUD to make "unofficial" comments that their complaints have
gone unheeded. 2 8
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Any analysis of the previously mentioned areas of HUD rent regulation and
monitoring or conditions is extremely difficult due to the fact that HUD
keeps no data on rent increases or inspections for the area as a whole. Any
data that does exist is highly inaccessible both in terms of HUD fees for
information and in research time. Therefore, in order to support the contention
that HUD has failed to fulfill its responsibility of maintaining decent housing
at affordable rent levels, it was necessary to rely on interviews, data on Boston
Rent Board approval of HUD increases and finally, data on rents actually
paid by tenants residing in subsidized developments in the Boston area.
Interviews with HUD officials indicate that HUD's present policy on rent
increases is to grant them automatically and as speedily as possible. There
is a quota of rent increase requests that must be processed per quarter unless the
default rate of the area is below 5% of the developments. There have been
no denials of rent increase applications since January of 1974 although
officials at HUD estimate that ten to fifteen increases per month have been
processed since that time. 2 9
An independent review using different criteria for rent increase approval.
could be used as one indicator of the justifiability of HUD rent increases. The
Boston Rent Control Board has found the HUD levels justifiable in only
one half of the cases considered. (See Table 4, Line #3).
Finally, it seems clear that HUD is not fullfilling its responsibility to
maintain rents at levels low to moderate income tenants can afford based
on the percentage of income that tenants in subsidized housing are now
paying in rent. Over 40% of the tenants in developments in serious financial
trouble in Boston are now spending more than 25% of their income on rent.
At least 1/4 of the Boston households in subsidized housing with incomes less
than $5,000 pay more than 35% of their income on housing.30
While emphasizing the role of mortgage insurer and initiator of production,
HUD has relegated its role of administrator of the 221(d)3 and 236 programs to
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RENT BOARD APPROVAL OF HUD APPROVED RENTS*
Rent Board Approval of HUD Rents
100% Less than 100%
1. Owner's request less
than HUD approved
2. Owner's request more
than HUD approved
3. Owner's request equal
to HUD approved
Total
Percent of total
20
14
0
6
9
15
26%
Total Percent
20
20
178
42
74%
35%
35%
30%
57
*As reported January, 1973 to February, 1975.
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second place. The practices of HUD have resulted in inadequate monitoring of
expenses and conditions at subsidized housing developments in many cases
without sufficient consideration of the economic situation or comments of the
tenantsresiding in those developments. This has happened at the expense of
the tenants--both in terms of rent levels and housing quality--and in fact may
be at the expense of the owners of the developments who may face high vacancy
rates due to poor conditions and unmarketable rent levels in the future.
THE ROLE OF THE BOSTON RENT CONTROL BOARD
The central question of this study has been whether local rent control
is counterproductive to the goals and purposes of the 221(d)3 and 236 federal
housing programs. Given the plural objectives of these programs--provision
of an incentive for production of multifamily developments,insurance of
the financial viability of developments constructed or rehabilitated under
these programs, maintenance of the quality of housing and provision of housing
units at rent levels that are not a burden on low to moderate income families--
it has been necessary to determine whether or not these objectives are suffic-
iently exclusive enough to require plural regulatorybodies in order that all
of the objectives be fulfilled. It is clear that HUD has emphasiz.ed its role
in production and as a mortgage insurer over the role relating to the remaining
two objectives. The conclusion of this study is that local rent control is
not counterproductive to the goals of the federal housing program, but
rather serves to complement the activities of HUD by regulating management of
developments built under the federal programs. Rents, maintenance and
deterioration of units are controlled by regulation of rent levels, thereby
providing incentives for decent maintenance and correction of dangerous con-
ditions. This emphasis is indicated in examination of the mechanisms and
procedures for rent and eviction regulation by the Boston Rent Control Board.
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Owners of subsidized housing that has not undergone substantial rehabil-
itation or has been completed or occupied before January 1, 1972, are required
to register with the Boston Rent Control Board and notify the Board of any
rent increases that they seek to implement. The Rent Board then notifies ten-
ants that they have a right to a hearing on the merits of the proposed increase.
If a hearing is requested or ordered by the Administrator, such a hearing is
to be scheduled within ten days of the date of notice of filing and is held
within 30 days after the receipt of the request. 1
Upon request of the tenants concerned, a city inspector may be sent to
inspect the development before the hearing. The inspector is to examine the
development for any violations of the state sanitary or Boston Building Code.
A hearing is then held at which time the landlord and tenants present evidence
justifying their claims before the Board. 2
After the presentation of the evidence, the Rent Board determines the
proper rent levels in accordance with the following considerations:
1. Increases or decreases in property taxes
2. Unavoidable increases or any decreases in operation and
maintenance expenses
3. Capital improvement of the housing accomodations
4. Increases or decreases in the living space or housing
services
5. Substantial deterioration of the housing accomo-
dations other than ordinary wear and tear or failure
to perform ordinary repair or maintenance. 3
The Rent Board calculates a fair net operating income,4 taking into account
a vacancy factor, payments that must be made to the reserve for replacement,
debt service payments and where appropriate, the cash distribution of the 6%
limited dividend. Rent levels are calculated to cover these expenses.
Opponents of local rent control have contended that his procedure at the
local level has hindered the operation of subsidized housing and is only a
costly second stage of bureaucratic red tape and delay. The bulk of those
arguments have been discussed in previous sections of this study and have been
found to be unsupported. The remaining argument as to the superfluousness of
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local regulation in part has been answered upon examination of HUD regulation
policy. As to the time delay contended, this study has found that the extra
level of bureaucracy does not produce a time delay that is deleterious to
the financial stability of the development.
There is no requirement that owners of subsidized developments wait until
HUD has approved the rent increase application before they apply to the Rent
Board. A simultaneous application would eliminate much of the alleged time
delay. Any delay is self-imposed by those owners who delay in preparing
their proposals for the Rent Board. As developers interviewed for purposes of
this study indicated, there is general agreement on the amount of time the
Rent Board usually takes to process an application. (See Appendix C).
Given this period of anticipation, most owners could avoid any delay in pro-
cessing, thus avoiding what losses of income could result from time delay.
Rather than hindering operation of the federal programs, rent control has
served to further the programs in the following ways.
The Rent Board provides for:
1) Impartial arbitration
2) Adequate financial scrutiny
3) Monitoring of conditions and quality of the development
4) Consideration of tenant hardship
5) A credible decision-making process
The Boston situation provides evidence on each point.
Impartial Arbitration
Because the Rent Board does not have a financial interest in the operation
of the development, the Board can act in an impartial way. The Board, composed
of landlords, tenants and disinterested parties,5 is balanced in such a way
that resulting decisions are not heavily biased in favor of any party.
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Adequate Financial Scrutiny
The Boston Rent Board has a fully paid staff of 24 which specifically reviews
rent increase requests unlike the understaffed rent increase division of HUD.0
Because the Administration is a local body with more familiarity with both
local housing conitions, local developers and the local housing market, their
standards for comparability allow a more indepth analysis of the financial
statement of the owner.
Finally, the Rent Board requires that the owner submit financial information
in a more disaggregated way than required by HUD. This disaggregation of figures
as well as routine requests for additional information provides for a more
comprehensive basis for rent level decisions.
Monitoring of Conditions and Quality of the Development
The Rent Board has a staff that inspects to insure that state and federal
requirements of habitability are met. Each unit that the inspector can gain
access to is inspected to provide for a closer monitoring of conditions. In
addition, information about the physical conditions of the development
is provided by tenants in the public hearing as well as through condition
report forms sent to the tenants with the notice of the landlord's increase
application.
In addition to providing for informational input as to the physical condition
of the development, the Rent Board formula takes into account the actual
expenses and financial situation of the development. The vacancy factor allowed
by the Rent Board is the actual vacancy or 5% of the development gross potential
income, whichever is lower, thus encouraging rent-up of vacant units. Any
capital expenditures for improvements are amortized over the useful life of
the investment item to provide for a more realistic appraisal of repair and
maintenance expenditures than that of HUD.7
Finally, and most importantly, by its regulations the rent board procedure
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encourages proper maintenance of the development by making rent increase
approval conditional on remedying code violations.8 By withholding the final
approval of rent increases until substantial code violations are remedied,
the Board attempts to guarantee the fullfillment of the objectives of the
federal program to provide quality housing.
Consideration of Tenant Hardship
The Rent Board formula takes into account all the necessary expenses of
the development, including unavoidable increases in operating expenses such
as increases in utilities,as well as allowing for debt service requirements,
loss due to vacancy and also the 6% limited dividend permitted by HUD. In
that way the landlord's financial hardship is taken into consideration. In
cases where the owner can substantiate necessary and unavoidable increases,
the Rent Board grants the increase request.
The hardship of the tenant is also taken into consideration in the
Boston FHA Rent Board regulations.9 Not only is the tenant hardship a part
of the mechanisms for rent increase approval, the rent control ordinance also
provides the tenant with the opportunity to request rent reductions based on
the same considerations previously mentioned. By determining a fair rent,
the Rent Board is fullfilling a purpose which, although de-emphasized by HUD,
is central to the intent of the federal programs established under Sections
221(d)3 and 236.
Credible Hearing Process
The very concept of hearings involving tenant and landlord as participants
imparts a certain measure of credibility to the process. It has been suggested
that such hearing procedures are somewhat beneficial in moderating adverse
tenant response (rent strikes or move-outs) toward rent hikes that they may
regard as unreasonable:
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One purpose of providing procedures is to generate
the feeling that justice has been done. Providing
a prior hearing might make a rent increase ultimate-
ly more acceptable to the tenants by giving them a
feeling that their interests have been fairly consid-
ered in reaching a decision.10
In practice, the operation of rent regulation by a local body such as
the Boston FHA Rent Control Board has resulted in full approval of approximately
49% (28 cases) of the 57 increase request cases heard by the Board from January,
1973 to February, 1975. Eighty-four percent of the 57 cases resulted in
Rent Board approval of 50% or more of the requested increase base on a more
careful review by the Rent Board.11 (See Table 5).
The reaction of those developers interviewed on the question of rent
control was ambiguous. Although all expressed dissatisfaction with the
additional complications involved, most agreed with the assessment of one
developer:
Rent control does not really hinder developers from going
ahead, although their first reaction is to say that it
does. It is a problem, but if the other factors are right
we'll swallow the problem.
The existence of local rent regulation does much to further the intent
of subsidized housing programs in its emphasis on maintenance and fair rent
levels, a function that HUD cannot perform given its interest in protecting
its financial position as mortgage insurer. The results achieved by the Board
are generally consistent with HUD results. As a local body, the board along
with other local agencies and state laws is designed to maintain the quality
of the housing stock of the city, while at the same time providing for
a measure of equitability to tenants, especially those tenants in low to
moderate income brackets intended to be served by the 221(d)3 and 236 programs.
page 47a
TABLE 5
RENT BOARD APPROVAL OF OWNERS, REQUESTS*
Number of units Approval Percentage Subtotal
Percent of
Column #1
100% 80-99% 50-79% 33-49%
Less than 50
50-100
More than 100
Total
Percent in
each category
*January, 1973 through February, 1975.
9
9
10
28
49%
2
2
1
5
8.7%
6
1
2
9
8
4
3
15
26%
25
16
16
57
44%
28%
28%
15.7%
CONCLUSION
Rent control does not appear to hinder investment in subsidized housing.
In addition, there is insufficient evidence to support the contention that
local rent control acts counter to the goals of the federally subsidized housing
programs by contributing to financial instability and improper maintenance
of these developments. Local rent control, rather, furthers the goals of
the federal programs in the following ways:
--The Rent Board procedure allows an opportunity for more rigor-
ous scrutiny of the financial operations of a development by
an impartial arbitrator, thus monitoring unnecessary or avoid-
able costs to keep rent levels within the reach of low to mod-
erate income tenants.
-- Rent control encourages proper maintenance of housing units by
making final increase approval contingent on remedy of code
violations.
--Rent control procedures allow for consideration of the finan-
cial hardship of both tenant and owner.
--Rent control hearing procedures lend credibility to the in-
crease decision by providing for tenant participation.
In October, 1975, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a
regulation purporting to pre-empt local rent control of FHA subsidized multi-
family housing. The issue of the validity of this new regulation is presently
being contested in the federal district court. The decision will hinge on the
extent of federal supremacy that the federal government can claim over federally
subsidized housing and whether local rent regulation is substantially different
from other local housing standards and regulation. Until the suit in question was
filed, HUD had maintained that the Congressional intent of the subsidized housing
programs was to allow local rent regulation as long as there was no conflict with
the interest of the federal government. This would seem to indicate that, until
the recent shift, the HUD position was that local rent control has been consist-
ent with the goals purposes and objectives of the federal programs. This view
is supported by this study.
FOOTNOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. Report of the President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent Home (Wash-
ington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 8.
2. Housing Act of 1949, 42 USC 1441 (1949).
3. See Robert Taggart, Low Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid (Baltimore,
1970) for a listing of federal programs.
In addition, the federal government plays an important role in the secondary
mortgage market where agencies like the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) and Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) buy and sell
mortgages with funds from the sale of government bonds or from the Treasury.
4. 13 USC 1715(d)3.
The interest rate for 221(d)3 mortgages is 3%. The Government National
Mortgage Association holds the mortgage at this below market interest rate.
5. Eligibility standards in the 221(d)3 program are as follows: Upper
limits for admission to units equal 160% to 180% of public housing limits
established for the area by the local housing authority. See Footnote
#8 for the most recent income limits for 221(d)3 in the Boston area.
As of June 30, 1972, an estimated 180,000 units of 221(d)3 housing were
available for occupancy.
6. 12 USC 17152-1.
7. The sponsor--limited dividend, non-profit, cooperative--obtains a mortgage
loan from a private bank and the federal government subsidizes the differ-
ence between the market interest rate and 1%. The effect of this procedure
is to spread the federal appropriations for subsidized housing over the
lifetime of the mortgage rather than in a lump sum at the completion of
construction as is the case with the 221(d)3 program.
8. The eligibility requirements of the 236 program are: Upper limits for
admission equal 135% of the income limits for admission to public housing
in the locality. Up to 20% of the subsidy payments may be made on behalf
of families whose income upon admission exceed those limits but are below
90% of the limits set by HUD for admission to 221(d)3 housing.
Income limits for the Boston area as of March 1975 are:
Family Size 221(d)3 Maximum Income 236 Maximum Income
1 $ 8,600 $ 7,740
2 10,450 9,405
3 or 4 12,300 11,070
5 or 6 14,150 12,735
7 or more 16,000 14,400
As of December, 1973, 451,000 236 units were either available for occupancy
or in processing stages.
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An additional federal subsidy is available for up to 20% of the units
in any development built under either the 221(d)3 or 236 programs.
Rather than.subsidizing mortgage interest rates, the Rent Supplement
program subsidizes rent directly. Tenants pay 25% of their adjusted
annual income in rent and the federal government pays the balance.
The Leased Housing program (Section 23) is a similar program with the
local housing authority providing the subsidy above 25% of the tenant's
income. Up to 20% of the units in 221(d)3 or 236 housing can be Leased Housing.
9. The Section 8 Existing Housing Program established by the 1974 Housing
and Community Development Act created a housing allo
awarded to tenants fullfilling the requirements of this program. Under
this program HUD subsidizes, through housing assistance payments, the
difference between 15-25% of an occupands gross income and the agreed
upon gross rent of existing standard housing units. For fiscal
year 1976, Congress has authorized $625 million to subsidize 400,000
families under this program.
10. Housing in the Seventies (Washington, D. C., Department of Housing and
Urban Development document, 1972), p. 4-7.
11. Langevin v. Chenango Court (447 F. 2d 301, 1971). See also: Findrilakis
v. Romney(USDC ND Calif., CA No. C-72-801 RFP, 1973); McQueen v. Drucker
(317 F. Supp 1122, 1128-37 D. Mass., 1970; 438 F. 2d 781, 1st Circuit,
1971, affirmed).
12. Ordinances of 1970, Chapter 11.
13. Ordinances of 1972, Chapter 19. This ordinance was extended in December,
1975, with a vacancy decontrol provision which has since been under
consideration by the Boston Housing Court.
14. Ibid., p. 1.
15. Ibid., p. 1.
HYPOTHESIS I
INCENTIVES TO INVESTMENT
1. There are four types of sponsrs of the subsidized housing programs. In
most cases (62% of the 236 developments as of 1972), there is a developer/
sponsor who remains as the owner or landlord once the project has been
completed; these are the limited dividend developer/sponsors. Builder/
sellers are another t..pe of sponsor. They develop a project in order to
sell it when it is ready for occupancy, usually to a non-profit owner.
Investor/sponsors develope a project in order to sell it when it is ready
for occupancy and then turn it over to a tenant cooperative (7% of the
236 developments built as of 1972 were tenant cooperatives). Finally,
there are non-profit sponsors, usually church, labor, or community groups
which have a commitment to the community in which the housing is to be
built (31% of the 236 developments built as of 1972 were owned by non-
profit sponsors). This study will be primarily concerned with the first
and last types of developer/sponsors.
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2. Philip David, Urban Land Development (Homewood, Ill., 1970), p. 278.
3. Ibid.,p. 277.
4. This is true for all but non-profit sponsors. The mortgage allowed for
these sponsors is 100% of the replacement cost of the development. No
euqity is required.
5. FHA Manual 72705 3(4), July, 1969. For 221(d)3 developments this figure
is closer to 6%.
6. The Office of Audit reports that, "About 4 1/2% of each limited dividend
mortgage is available to indteproject construction." Report on Audit
of Section 236 Multifamily Housing Programs (Washington, D. C., Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development, document no. 05-2001-500, January
29, 1972), p. 41.
7. The HUD procedure is to compare the proposed project site with equivalent
sites. Comparable sites are selected from data banks and recordings.of
sites recently sold or offered for sale and are often dissimilar to the
to the land under consideration.
8. Report on Audit, 2R. cit., p. 41.
Tax Shelters
1. Distribution phase is upon sale or foreclosure of the property.
2. Interest on construction loan is not subsidized but is set at the market rate.
3. If the deduction is taken during the construction phase of the development
this deduction must be subtracted from the depreciable basis used to calcu-
late deductions due to depreciation during the operation phase. (See
Section on Accelerated Depreciation and also Appendix A5).
4. Also available is the sum-of-the-years-digit method.
The double-declining balance method works as follows: first, a
depreciable basis is determined. This basis is the total cost of the
development, which includes construction costs, fees and the Builder's
and Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance or Builder's Profit, excluding
the assessed value of land on which the development is built. Each
year this depreciable basis or the assumed value of the building decreases
by the annual depreciation deduction for that year. This depreciation
deduction is based on a depreciation rate--with the double declining
balance method it is two times 1/useful life of the development (usually
25 to 35 years). The rate is applied to the depreciable basis of the
previous year to determine the amount of depreciation for that year.
(See Appendix AS for depreciation calculation).
5. Federal income tax is calculated as follows; annual depreciation is
deducted yearly from the owner's gross income.(gToss income being the
income remaining after operating expense, debt service and real estate
taxes) and the amortization of the debt based on the constant yearly
debt service payment. For 236 housing, an eight percent interest rate
before subsidy is allowed in calculation of amortization. This gives
a taxable income figure.
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6. Tax Reform Act Pub L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat, 487 @ 521 (a), 83 Stat. 649.
7. Touche, Ross and Company, A Study of Tax Considerations in Multifamily
Housing Investments (Washington, D. C., Department of Housing and Urban
Development, HUD contract H-1227, U. S. Government Printing Office, #2300-
0191, 1972), p. 81.
8. Due to the long term debt service, the amortization payments included
in the constant yearly mortgage payment are relatively low in the early
years of operation. In 236 housing where the full market interest rate
is treated as part of the constant payment, the amortization is even lower.
(See Appendix A6).
9. Note in "Procedural Due Process in Government Subsidized Housing", Harvard
Law Review (Volume 86, 1973),p. 884.
10. General partners are responsible for management of the property and have
control over the partnership. Limited partners have only limited liability
and no control over management or distribution of funds. In the sample
development example,17% of the cost of the development was syndicated
making proceeds approximately $700,000. The proceeds were calculated based
on the assumption that limited dividend sponsors would pay this amount for
a 15% return on investment over 21 years of participation. (See Appendix
A9 for Distribution of Profits).
11. Tax on syndication proceeds can be handled in two ways. The developer
can treat excess capital either as capital gains or return of capital
invested. If the proceeds are treated as gains, capital gains tax--one
half of the ordinary income tax rate--is paid by the developer/sponsor
as personal income tax. If the developer/sponsor has retained a sufficient
claim to omership through remaining as a general partner,the excess proceeds
can be treated as a return of capital in that they are funds not required
to complete the project and also belong to him. The developer/sponsor's
depreciable basis in the project would be decreased, then, with
computation of accelerated depreciation. For a more detailed explanation
see James Wallace, A Critique of Federal Income Tax Incentives in the Develop-
ment and Operation of Subsidized Rental Housing (Phd. Thesis, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, June, 1972), p. 215.
12. The same is true for properties that have been foreclosed. In this case,
the amount of the balance of the mortgage at the time of foreclosure is
treated as the sales price. This is also the sales price used in the
tax calculations in the appended example. (See Appendix A8).
13. A minimum tax preference must be paid on the excluded portion of
the capital gain to the extent that it exceeds $30,000. This tax is 10%
of the tax preference item.
14. This refers to the recapture provision which requires that gain upon sale
or foreclosure is subject to recapture of all depreciation taken in excess
of what would have been taken had the straight-line method of depreciation
been used in lieu of the double-declining balance method. For subsidized
housing, the 1969 Tax Reform Act provides for total recaputre of
excess depreciation if the development is sold within the first year of
ownership and all additional depreciation is to be recaptured up to 20
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months. After 20 months, 100% recapture is reduced by 1% per month
of ownership so that after 10 years of ownership there is no recapture
and income from resale or foreclosure is subject only to capital gains tax.
15. Touche, Ross and Co., op. cit., p. 19.
16. The owner must sell the property to tenants, a cooperative or non-profit
organization and must reinvest within one year from the date of sale of the
development in order to qualify for this exemption. Maximum sale price
cannot exceed the initial equity plus the amount required to pay the
remaining mortgage loaL in addition to an amount equal to tax on gain
realized from depreciation as a result of sale.
17. This term means that the taxpayer-investor is subject to an average tax
rate of 50% of the amount of income which is sheltered by tax loss from
the project. James Wallace gives an example: Here an individual with a
taxable income of $48,000 a year, except for the rental project in which
he/she owns a share, claims a tax loss of $26,000 as a result of his/her share
in the project and has a taxable income reduced by $13,000. The tax
avoided is calculated as follows:
Income Range Tax Rate Tax
$22-26,000 40% T7600
26-32,000 45% 2,700
32-38,000 50% 3,000
38-44,000 55% 3,000
44-48,000 60% 2,400
Income sheltered--$26,000 Tax Avoided--$13,000 Average 13,000
Tax Rate 26,000 ~ .50
18. Internal rate of return is a method used by investors to determine the
rate of return on an investment over a period of time given the discounted
value of revenue earned in the future. Returns each year are discounted
at various rates depending on the desired return and the sum of dis-
counted earnings over the period of investment is compared with the initial
cost of investment. For a more detailed explanation of this and other
methods for ranking investments see Wallace, op. cit., p. 185-189.
19. Wallace, p. cit., p. 214.
20. This study has not been published. It was done by the Greater Boston
Community Development Corporation, November 26, 1974.
21. In August, 1974, returns on shrt term investment in capital instruments were:
$100,000 certificates of deposit (30 Days) 9.1%
$ 10,000 treasury bills (90 Days) 7.0%
$ 10,000 treasury bills (6 Months) 7.5%
Commercial paper (3 Months) 9.2%
Municipal notes (1 year) 4.5%
THE EFFECT OF RENT CONTROL ON ACTUAL INVESTMENT
1. A more extensive study, Tax Considerations in Multifamily Housing Investment,
op. cit., showed similar results. Investors from six cities were asked what
factors were most important in their decision to invest in low to moderate
Notes page 6
income housing under the federal subsidy programs. Of the forty investors
who invested or planned to invested in subsidized housing, 20% cited
better financing, 20% cited better tax shelters and 18% cited a larger
market for this types of housing, while only 12% listed better rate of return.
Of the 72 investors who did not invest in the program options, 32% cited a
lower rate of return on investment and 28% cited FHA red tape as reasons
for their decisions not to invest. However, the study found that approx-
imately 70% of those investors were unaware of the tax shelter and leveraging
potential built into the programs. Of those who did not invest, lack of
knowledge of benefits appeared to preclude investment.
2. Although a comparison of Boston with the nation would indicate whether the
Boston experience was unique or whether it followed a national trend,
this kind of analysis was impossible ude to limitations on data. There
was no data available on the national application rate for FHA subsidized
housing. Only data on national approval of applications was accessible.
This was not used due to variations in regional application acceptance.
3. Savings and Loan Fact Book: 1974 (Chicago, U. S. League of Savings Associations,
1974), p. 63.
4. Lyle E. Gramley, "Short Term Cycles in Housing Production: An Overview
of Problems and Possible Solutions", Federal Reserve Staff Study: Ways
to Moderate Fluctuations in Housing Construction (Washington, D. C., Board
of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 1972), p. 17.
S. Savings and Loan Fact Book, op. cit., p. 22.
6. Ibid., Table 13, p. 22; Table 33, p. 40; Chart 19, p. 42; Table 107, p. 126.
7. Chapter 708, Acts of 1966, as amended.
8. What's Up and Coming: MHFA Closed Projects (Massachusetts, Massachusetts Hous-
ing Finance Agency, August, 1975).
9. John Orlando Chike Enwonwu, Development Process in Housing (M. C. P. Thesis
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971), p. 76-77.
10. What's Up and Coming..., op. cit.
HYPOTHESIS II
FACTORS AFFECTING THE HEALTH OF THE DEVELOPMENT
Operation Phase: Cost Components
1. A fund used for replacement of items which wear out during the normal life
of the development such as refrigerators, water heaters, disposals, paint.
The replacement res-rve fund is built from yearly payments that typically
amount to .4% of the replacement cost of the development. Payments to
the fund are made with each mortgage payment and withdrawl of funds is
subject to HUD approval.
2. Electric rates rose 23% from 1974 to 1975,with electric space and water
heating up by 19% from 1974 to 1974. Gas for rental apartment housing rose
by 14% for the same years. However, Massachusetts has a special rating for
owners of publically supported housing, Classification #9,which is 27% cheaper
*Assume a time lag of a year between application and construction start.
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than the apartment rate. This rate rose by 13% from 1975 to 1975.
3. Chapter 121A of the Massachusetts General Laws. This percentage is tax
assessment based on gross receipts after deductions of operation and
maintenance expenses, fees, interest and amortization, mortgage premiums,
dividends, transfers to reserve for replacement; it is typically about
15% of gross income.
4. Boston Urban Observatory, Subsidized Multifamily Rental Housing in the
Boston Metropolitan Area (Boston, Massachusetts, October, 1973), p. 70.
5. An Office of Audit Report, Report on Special Review of Tenants Complaints
(Case Number 09-17-3001-5301, August 16, 1972), p. 20, states that for
the five Boston area developments reviewed, the following inequitable
charges for rental equipment from a subsidiary equipment rental firm were:
Cost Monthly Rental
Pick-up $3,800 $225
Tractor 4,500 300
Lawnmower 750 40
Sweeper 3,200 160
This equipment is typically rented for three to five years.
6. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 62-68.
7. Housing Investment in the Inner City (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972), p. 56.
Development process
1. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 24.
2. In general the stages of the development process are:
Prefeasibility
Feasbility
Conditional Commitment
Firm Commitment
Initial Closing
Construction Period
Cost Certification
Final Closing
3. This option does not apply to the non-profit sponsors. The mortgage amount
is 100% of the replacement cost--FHA fees, construction costs, land
costs, financing fees, architects fees, etc.--so that no equity is required.
4. Wallace, op. cit., p. 205.
5. Boston Urban Observatory, Note, op. cit., p. 54.
6. Ibid., p. 57.
7. Report on Audit of 236..., op. cit., p. 38-39.
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8. "Construction Period to Final Closing", HUD Handbook 4435.1, p. 1-7,
paragraphs 1-8.
9. A specific instance was noted by Langley Keyes in the Boston Rehabiliation
Program (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970). He reports on page 124
that change orders needed to meet Boston Building Department standards
resulted in approval of $350,100 in additional costs for one development.
10. Letter from Allister Shepherd to Edie Bilotta, May 10, 1973 .
Mr. Shepherd is an independent physical engineer with fourteen years of
experience including four years as an engineering consultant to FHA.
He also reports in a letter to Barry Brodsky dated October 23, 1973,
that in one development change orders approved by HUD increased construction
costs by over $300,000. Most of these changes "indicate inadequate engin-
eering in the original design plus poor control and review by FHA".
11. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 47.
The normal construction period assumed by HUD and the sponsor is 18 months.
In the author's review of the "Rental Housing Project Income Analysis and
Appraisal" for one Boston development, change orders amounting to $253,000
were approved largely because of delay in construction from the estimated
14 month period to 24 months.
12. Ibid.,p. 47.
13. Ibid., p. 51.
14. Author review of Project Inspection Report (HUD Form 2449) for one
Boston development--023-55128.
15. Letter from Edward B. Hick, Operation Specialist, Department of Housing
and Urban Development to Richard Tyrell, January 29, 1973 refers to the
granting of a Supplemental Loan under Section 241 for Project 023-44075.
16. Louise Elving, Public Subsidies and Private Managers: Critical Issues
in Mansgement of Federally Assisted Rental Housing (M. C. P. Thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, February, 1974), p. 129-142.
17. Section 227 of the National Housing Act.
18. Letter from William Hernandez, Acting Director of the Area Office of
Housing and Urban Development, Region 1, June, 1974.
19. Report on Audit..., op. cit., p. 3.
20. Emily Achtenberg and Michael Stone, Tenants First: A Reserach and Organizing
Guide to FHA Housing (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974), p. 36.
Income limitations are changed every eighteen months.
21. Refer to section of this study, Summary of Tax Shelter.Benefits.
22. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 199.
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EFFECT OF RENT CONTROL ON DEFAULT...
1. Chapter IV of Title 24, part 403.
2. 40 FR 49319.
3. "Affadavit of Fred Phaender", City of Boston v. Carla Hill, et. al.
(C. A. No. 75-902-C, March 20, 1975), p. 7. Mr. Fred Phaender is
Director of the Loan Management Division under the Undersecretary of the Dept. of
Housing and Urban Development.
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Monthly Default Status lists. Division of Loan Management, Area Office,
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
6. "Phaender Deposition--Exhibit #13", Kargman v. Sullivan et. al. (USDC No.
71-27112-F, March, 1974).
7. "Phaender Deposition", op. cit., p. 369-374.
8. "Affadavit of Fred Phaender", Op. cit., p. 7-8.
9. Monthly Report on HUD Held Mortgages. Division of Loan Management, Area
Office, Department of Housing and Urban Development.
10. Compiled from Boston FHA Rent Board lists of registered and exempt properties
and Rent Board data sheet on Rent Board approvals from January,1973, through
February, 1975.
11. Cambridge, Massachusetts, September, 1969.
12. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1970.
13. The Boston Urban Observatory study, op. cit., p. 35, found a correlation
between major developers and troubled projects. Six major developers repre-
senting about 40% of all subsidized housing units in the Boston SMSA
owned developments that were classified a being in financial difficulty.
14. Ibid., p. 41, 51.
THE DUAL ROLE OF HUD
1. Letter from HUD General Counsel Office,September 18, 1973, concerning coverage
of FHA multifamily subsidized housing in Prince George's County, Md.
2. Insured Project Managment Guide 209 as required by 24 CFR 221. 531 (c).
3. See Burbon v. Wilmington Parking Authority (365 US 715, 1961).
4. Housing in the Seventies, op. cit., p. 4-69.
5. William Hernandez, Boston Globe, January 30, 1975, p. 10. -
6. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 110-113.
7. "Phaender Deposition", op. cit., p. 248.
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8. Report on Special Review..., op. cit.
9. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 196.
10. Greater Benefits Can Be Derived from Improved HUD Audits of Program
Participants, Comptroller General of the United States (Department of
Housing and Urban Development, GA 1.13; H 81/60, 1974), p. 16.
11. Ibid., p. 24.
This study went on to cite a specific case of a Michigan subsidized housing
development that had been investigated by the Office of Audit. The Area
Office in this case had cleared 8 of 9 findings without meeting with the
program participants.
12. Compensation for Management Services in Multifamily Housing Projects with
Insured or HUD Held Mortgages (Department of Housing and Urban Development
HM q 4381.5, July, 1974).
The management fee can be increased by 1/4% for each award of superior
management up to 2% above the initial fee established for that development.
The intent of superior management awards is to provide an incentive for
better management.
13. Elving, op. cit., p. 45. In an addition, an examination of HUD properties list
shows that 58%o of the Boston subsidized developments are managed by manage-
ment companies that manage four or more developments; one company manages 18.
14. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 75.
15. Interview with Leo McCuskor, Chairman of the Boston FHA Rent Board, October
7, 1975.
16. Management of HUD Insured Multifamily Projects Under Sections 221(d)3
and 236 of the National Housing Act (Department of Housing and Urban
Development, HM G 4351.1, Rev. October, 1974), p. 24.
17. "Phaender Deposition", op. cit., p. 269.
18. "Testimony of Emily Achtenberg", Kargman v. Sullivan et. al., op. cit.,
Day 2, p. 125-126. Emily Achtenberg is a Housing Specialist employed at
Urban Planning Aid.
19. "Testimony of John Mulvaney", Kargman v. Sullivan et. al., op. cit.,
Day 4, p. 83-99. John Mulvaney is the HUD Area Assistant Engineer for
the Boston area.
20. Author review of Annual Physical Inspection Reports(HUD Form 92470) for
Project 023-55008.
21. An Evaluation of the Boston Urban Rehabilitation Program, op. cit., p. 54.
22. "Testimony of William Hernandez", Kargman v. Sullivan et. al., 2p. cit.,
Day 3, p. 154.
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23. "Testimony of Kenneth Salk", Ibid., Day 4, p. 63-64. Mr. Salk is the
Director of Housing Management of the Area Office of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development for the Boston area.
24. Department of Housing and Urban Development, HM G 4350.1, Chapter 4,
Section 3 3b (1), April, 1973.
25. "Phaender Deposition", op. cit. p. 4-81, 4-65, 5-72 and 503.
26. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit. p. 137, 171.
27. Chapter IV of Title 24, part 401.
28. In one incident, a group of tenants met with HUD officials to present
hundreds of complaints relevant to HUD procedure on implementation of
rent increases; the rent increase was approved by HUD fifteen minutes
after tenants had left the meeting at which they presented their com-
plaints.
Tenants at another Boston area development submitted signed affadavits
challenging the financial information submitted by the landlord, The
rent increase was approved December 31, 1975, the day after the affadavits
had been submitted.
29. Interview with Mary Noble, Loan Management Division, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, November 10, 1975.
30. Boston Urban Observatory, op. cit., p. 74.
THE ROLE OF THE BOSTON RENT CONTROL BOARD
1. Boston Rent Control Regulations, Regulation 3, Section 7, February 1, 1973.
2. The Board consists of "five residents of the city appointed by the Mayor
including one tenant who owns no housing accomodations and one landlord
who owns or manages at least twenty rental units in the City and three
members representing the public interest, none of whom may own or manage
more than three rental units in the city". Ordinances of the City of
Boston, Chapter 19, Section 2(a), p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 9.
4. Fair net operating income is the amount of income generated by a development
after operating expenses, not including debt service and reserve for
replacement are deducted from the gross potential annual income (rent times
number of units in each apartment type). A base year is used, usually two
years prior to the last full year of operation prior to application. If
fair net operating income is between 35% and 60% of the gross potential
income, that amount is added to the expenses accepted for the year under
consideration to establish a required gross potential income. That income
is used to calculate the rent increase necessary for each type of apartment
after the level is tested to determine that it does, in fact, cover vacancy,
debt service, reserve for replacement and cash distribution of the limited
dividend.
5. See Footnote #2 of this section.
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6. "Testimony of Bernard Shadray, Jr.", op. cit, Day 3, p. 49.
7. Interview with Leo McCuskor, op. cit.
8. Boston Rent Control Regulations, Regulation 6, Section 8, p. 5.
9. Ibid.,Regulation 6, Sections 4(i), 5(c)4.
10. "Procedural Due Process.. .", op. cit., p. 900.
11. Leo McCuskor indicated in the previously noted interview that the major
reasons for approval of lower rent increases by the Boston FHA Rent Board
included lower vacancy allowance, amortization of the capital investment
expenditures and owner's insufficient substantiation of reported expenses.
Other increase approvals were held until repairs had been completed.
APPENDIX A: Analysis of Tax Shelter and Reduced Equity Benefits
This appendix details an internal rate of return on investment in a
sample 236 developemtn. The number of parameters and variable in any general
analysis of tax shelter benefits is large. Due to the complexity of tax
provisions, the varying components of each development and variations in construct-
ion costs and time, partnership agreements and tax brackets of each investor, it
is not possible to determine benfits for every federally subsidized development.
Therefore, this sample development was chosen to facilitate description of the
workings of the incentive provisions discussed in the body of this study. In
choosing a sample in order to analyze benefits of the subsidized programs,
an attempt was made to construct a representatvie developemtn and to analyze its
financial arrangements in a manner typically used by investors. The following
subsections of this appendix include:
Al Assumptions about the Development
A2 Calculation of Equity Requirement and Mortgage Amount
A3 Calculation of Actual Investment and Yearly Rate of Return
A4 Construction Phase Tax Deductions
A5 Calculation of Depreciation
A6 Breakdown: Yearly Interest and Amortization of Mortgage
A7 Tax Shelter Calculations and Assumptions
A8 Taxes Upon Sale
A9 Distribution of Profits to Limited Partners
AlO Return from Syndication Proceeds
APPENDIX Al: Assumptions about the Development
236 housing, new construction, limited dividend sponsor, 200 units
Construction Costs
Job costs
Construction Fees
Architect & Engineer
Builder's Overhead
Carrying Charges & Financing
Interest during Construction
(one year @ 8%)
Financing Fee
Real Estate Taxes
FHA Examination & Inpsection
Title & Recording Fees
Legal & Organizational Fees
$170,000
. 30,000
160,000
55,000
35,000
Fees 30,000
20,000
Total Excluding Land & Builder's Profit
Builder's and Sponsor's Profit and Risk
(Assuming Identity of Interest)
Land (Assessed Value)
Replacement cost
3,527,000
353,000
200,000
$4,080,000
In order to perform the tax calculation taking the reduced equity benefits into
account, the mortgage amount was determined by taking 99% of all costs of construct-
ion excluding land plus 90% of the land value. The equity is approximately
1.5% of total costs dued to reduced equity provisions of land valuation and
application of BSPRA.
Mortgage Amount
Yearly Constant Payment @ 8% Interest
Equity Requirement (11.1% of mortgage amount)
Actual Equity
Limited Dividend (6% of Required Equity)
Replacement Reserve Payments (.4% of Mortgage Amount)
$4,021,000
337,207
442,332
59,000
26,540
16,084
$3,000,000
200,000
300,000
27,000
APPENDIX A2: Calculation of Equity Requirement and Mortgage Amount
This calculation has been presented to facilitate description of the reduced
equity and land valuation benfits of the federally subsidized housing programs.
The mortgage amounts and equity actually advance are not the same as those
levels used in the remainder of the tax benefit calculations--the amounts
listed in Appendix Al. They do serve to indicate, however, the uses of BSPRA
and landmarkup.
Method of calculation:
First, the mortgage amount is calcualted for two differnt cases--in a
situation where there is no identity of interest between builder and sponsor
and one in which an identity of interst exists. In the first case, the Builder's
Profit is 6.75% of the job costs. In the second case, the Builder's and Sponsor's
Profit and Risk Allowance is 10% of total construction costs.
Second, the assessed value to land is added to determine replacement cost.
The mortgage amount is calculated from this basis. It is 90% of the replacement
cost. Required equity is the remaining amount. Limited dividend is 6% of the
required equity.
Without BSPRA
Total Construction Costs
Builder's Profit
(6.75% of job costs)
Land (Assessed Value)
Replacement cost
Mortgage Amount
(90% of above)
Equity Requirement
Limited Dividend
(6% of Equity)
$3,527,000
202,500
200,000
3,929,500
3,536,500
392,950
23,577
With BSPRA
Total Construction Costs $3,527,000
BSPRA
(10% of above)
Land (Assessed Value)
Replacement cost
Mortgage Amount
(90% of above)
Equi ty Requirment
Limited Dividend
(6% of Equity)
353,000
200,000
4,080,000
3,672,000
408,000
24,480
The limited dividend for the identity of interest sponsor is clearly more
than that of the non-identity of interest sponsor. The required equity of
the former, however, appears to be greater. In practice, this is not the
actual equity put forward by the sponsor. Actual equity will be calculated in
the next subsection of this appendix.
APPENDIX A3: Calculation of Actual Investment and Yearly Rate of Return
This calculation shows the benefit to the investor of the BSPRA and
land markup allowances of the federally subsidized programs. It utilizes
the calculations made in the preceeding appendix subsection, not those figures
presented in subsection 1.
Method of Calculation:
First, two calculations are made assuming two different cases. The first
case has the builder splitting the BSPRA with the sponsor. This is typical
for a builder who is not a wholly owned subsidiary of the owner. In the
second case, the builder is a wholly owned subsidiary so the owner can apply
the entire BSPRA to the equity. Each profit is subtracted from required equity
to indicate application to the equity to arrive at new actual equity (cash investment).
Second, the land markup benefit is shown. The dollar amount returned to
the sponsor/(actual equity) is found by subtracting the actual cost of the land.
Actual cost of land i assumed to be one half of the assessed value. This
figure is consistent with the Report on Audit findings.
Finally, the return on equity is calculated using the limited dividend
determined in the previous subsection.
I. Application of BSPRA
BSPRA Split with Builder
Required Equity
1/2 of BSPRA
New Equity
$408,000
(176,500)
$231,500
Entire BSPRA Applied to Equity
Required Equity $408,000
All of BSPRA
New Equity
II. Application of Assessed Land Costs
BSPRA Split with Builder
New Equity
Land (Assessed Value)
231,500
(200,000)
Entire BSPRA Applied to Equity
New Equity 55,000
Land(Assessed Value)
31,500
(200,000)
(145,000)
Actual Land Cost
Actual Equity
100,000
$131,500 *
Actual Land Cost
Returned to Sponsor
III. Cash Return and Yearly Rate of Return
BSRPA Split with Builder
Actual Equity
Limited Dividend
Rate of Return
131 ,500
24,480
Entire BSPRA Applied to Equity
Actual Equity
Limited Dividend 2
24,480 = 18.6%
131,500
*3.2% of Replacement Cost
(353,000)
$ 55,000
100,000
$45,000
0
1,480
Infinite
APPENDIX A4: Construction Phase Tax Deductions
These deductions are based on losses during construction which can be
allowed as deductions. Tax loss allowances include the following fees and
expenses:
Interest during Construction
(@8%)
Financing Fees
Real Estate Taxes
FHA Examination & Inspection Fees
Title & Recording Fees
Total Lossess (taxable income)
$160,000
55,000
35,000
30,000
20,000
$300,000
Method of Calculation:
The investor is assumed to be in the 50% tax bracket. (See Footnote #17, p. 5
of notes). Income taxes are 1/2 of income received. In this case negative income
(loss) was $300,000. This would allow the investor to write-off 1/2 of that
loss thus avoiding taxes on income from other sources:
Tax savings=l/2 of Tax Loss=l/2 x $300,000=$150,000
APPENDIX A5: Calculation of Depreciation
This subsection shows the accelerated depreciation or paper loss in
value that an investor can claim as a loss for income tax purposes. The Tax
Reform Act of 1969 allows the investor to utilize a 200% declining balance
method to depreciate the property owned.
Method of Calculation:
First a depreciable basis or initial value must be determined. The initial
value is the replacement cost minus the construction depreciation taken minus
the cost of land.
Second, the depreciation for the first year and following years are calculated.
Each year the building under consideration depreciates by a depreciation
rate--200% declining or double-declining balance method-- which is 1/ useful
life of the development or 1/25 in this example times 2:
Depreciation rate = 1/25 x 2 = .08
This rate is applied to the initial value of the development to determine the
amount of depreciation. In this case it is .08 x $3,580,000 = $286,000. This
amount is then subtracted from the initial value or depreciable basis to arrive
at a new depreciable basis. The depreciation rate is applied to this new
basis to arrive at a new depreciation value for the second year of operation and
so on. Depreciation was calculated assuming 21 years of owernship.
I. Depreciable Basis
Replacement Costs
Land (Assessed Value)
Construction Phase
Deductions
Depreciable Basis for
First Year
$4,080,000
(200,000)
(300,000)
$3,580,000
II. Depreciation of Sample Development
Deduction
$286,400
263,488
242,408
223,016
205,174
188,760
173,660
159,767
146,985
New Basis
$3,293,600
3,030,112
2,787,703
2,564,686
2,359,511
2,170,750
1,997,090
1,837,322
1,690,336
Year
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Deduction
$135,226
124,408
114,456
105,299
96,875
89,125
81,995
75,435
69,401
63,848
58,740
New Basis
$1,555,110
1,430,701
1,316,245
1,210,945
1,114,069
1,024,944
942,948
867,512
798,111
734,262
675,000
Year
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
APPENDIX A6: Breakdown of Yearly Interest and Amortization of Mortgage
This breakdown assumes a 40 year mortgage at 8% interest for tax purposes.
The yearly constant payment can be determined by consulting any constant
payment table.
Interest
$321,696.00
320,455.00
319,114.90
317,667.60
316,104.30
314,416.00
312,592.70
310,623.50
308,496.80
306,199.90
303,719.30
301,040.30
298,146.90
295,022.00
291,,146.90
288,022.40
284,066.00
279,814.70
275,223.20
270,264.50
Amortization
$15,511.50
16,752.40
18,092,60
19,540.00
21,103.20
22,791,50
24,614.80
26,584.00
28,710.70
31,007.60
33,408.20
36,167.20
39,060.60
42,185.50
45,560.30
49,205.10
53,141.50
57,382.80
61,984.30
66,943.00
Balance
$4,021,200.00
4,005,628.50
3,988,936.00
3,970,848.50
3,930,200.20
3,907,408.70
3,882,793.90
3,856,209.90
3,827,499.20
3,796i491.60
3,763,003.40
3,726,836.20
3,687,775.60
3,645,590.10
3,600,029.90
3,550,824.70
3,487,683.20
3,440,290.30
3,378,306.00
3,311,363.00
Year of
payment
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
APPENDIX A7: Tax Shelter Calculations and Assumptions
This portion of the appendix shows the actual tax benefits accruing to the
investor in this sample development as well as indicating what amount of money
limited partners would invest to receive a 15% return on their investment.
The following assumptions are made in the tax calculations:
Investor Characteristics
Tax Bracket of the Investors
Rate of Return Desired by Limited
Pattners
Annual Cash Distributions-Yearly
Reserve for Replacemnt Payments
(10 years)
Pertinent Column
(Column 6)50%
15%
$26,540
$16,084
(Discount rate, Column 9)
(Columns 1 and 7)
(Column 4)
Amortization
Depreciation Deductions
Distribution Conditions
Sales Date
Sales Price
See Appendix A6
See Appendix A5
After 21 years
$3,311,363
(See Appendix A8)
Method- of calculation:
First, cash flow (Column 1) is added to amortization (Column 2) for income.
Then, depreciation (Column 3) and reserve (Column 4) are subtracted from income
to produce taxable income (loss) (Column 5). In Column 6, half of the taxable
income (loss) is taken as tax savings in most years as loss is greater
than taxable income. In year 21, capital gains upon sale is taxed ($534,090.75--
See Appenix A8). Cash dividend for each year is added to tax savings (Column 6 +
Column 7 = Column 8). Benefits to the investor are shown in Column 8.
Assuming that the investor syndicates the equity, how much will limited
partners invest to receive a 15% return over a period of 21 years? This is
calculated by applying a discount factor (Column 9) to the benefits and summing
these discounted yearly returns. The limited partners will be willing to contribute
$697,687.90.
(Column 2)
(Column 3)
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APPENDIX A7
TAX BENEFITS
6
TAX SAVINGS (COST)
$150,000
114,132.25
102,055.80
90,845.70
80,426.00
70,723.40
61,672.25
53,210.60
45,479.50
37,825.15
46,881.20
40,231.90
33,916.40
27,891.20
21,116.75
16,554.35
11,166.95
5,918.75
776.10
(4,296.15)
(9,329.50)
(534,090.75) Cap
7
CASH DIVIDEND
0
24,540
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
8
BENEFITS
$150,000.00
138,672.25
126,595.80
115,385.70
104,966.00
95,263.40
86,212.25
77,750.60
69,819.50
62,365,15
71,421.20
64,771.90
58,456,40
52,431.20
45,656.75
41,094.35
35,706.95
30,458.75
25,316.10
20,243.85
(518,880.25)
$1,991,468.35
9
DISCOUNT FACTOR(15%)
1
.87
.756
.658
.572
.497
.432
.376
.327
.284
.247
.215
.187
.163
.141
.123
.107
.093
.081
.070
.061
10
DISCOUNTED RETURN
$150,000.00
120,644.90
95,706.40
75,723.80
60,040.50
47,345.90
37,243,70
29,234.20
22,831.00
17,711.70
17,641.00
13,925.90
10,931.30
8,546.30
6,437.60
5,054.60
3,820.60
2,832.60
2,050.60
1,417.00
(31,651.70)
$697.687.90
ital gains on sale
APPENDIX A8: Taxes Upon Sale
Ownership of the development is held in this example for 21 years. At
that time it is assumed that the owner will sell the development for the
balance of the amortization left on the mortgage. The sale is taxed at
capital gains rate.
Method of calculation:
In order to determine the tax upon sale in the 21st year, it is necessary
to determine the value of the property at that time. This is done by subtracting
the total depreciation from the replacement cost of the development. First,
however, the amount of depreciation that has been taken must be determined.
This is done by subtracting the remaining depreciable balance (See Appendix
A5,basis in the 21st year) from the original depreciable basis (See Appendix
A5, Part I).
The value of the development is then subtracted from the sales price
(balance of existing mortgage) to determine the gain upon sale. This is
taxed at the capital gains rate for an investor in the 50% bracket:
Captial gains rate = 1/2 of ordinary tax rate = 1/2 x .50 = .25
I. Amount of Depreciation
Original Depreciable Basis
Remaining Depreciable Balance
Amount of Depreciation
$3,580,000
(675,000)
2,905,000
II. Value of the Development in 21st Year
Replacement Cost
Amount of Depreciation
New Basis or Value
III. Gain on Sale
Balance of Mortgage or Sales Price
New Basis
Gain Upon Sale
Captial gains Tax
$4,080,000
(2,905,000)
$1,175,000
$3,311,363
(1,175,000)
$2,136,363
.25 x $2,136,363 = $534,090.75
APPENDIX A9: Distribution of Profits to Limited Partners
It is assumed that there are eleven limited partners; ten partners
contribute about 8% of the contribution of the limited partners and one
partner contributes about 18%. The general partners make a contribution
of $188 but receive 10% of the annual profits and losses. Returns for
Year 2 are shown:
Limited Dividend
Depreciation Deduction
Year 2
$26,540
$228,264
Limi ted Contri-
Parnter bution
% of Total
L. P. Contr.
Share of Share of
Annual Pro- Dividend
fits & Loss Year 2
Depreci-
ation De-
duction
50% Bracket
Tax Savings
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
7.3%
17%
90%
$1,937 $16,633
1,937
1,937
1,937
1,937
1,937
1,937
1,937
1,937
1,937
4,512
16,663
16,663
16,663
16,663
16,663
6,663
16,663
16,663
16,663
38,805
$8,332
8,332
8,332
8,332
8,332
8,332
8,332
8,332
8,332
8,332
19,403
$23,882 $205,435 $102,723
$2,654 $22,826 $11,413
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
Total
$57,250
57,250
57,250
57,250
57,250
57,250
57,250
57,250
57,250
57,250
125,000
$697,500
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
8.2%
17.9%
100%
General
Partner $188
APPENDIX A10: Return from Syndication Proceeds
As the calculations in Appendix A7, Column 10 indicate, the investors
who wish to participate in a limited partnership would pay close to $700,000
to receive a 15% reutrn on investment in the sample development. This is
approximately 17% of replacement cost of the development. If the developer
uses a four year installment plan, the internal rate of return on investment
would be over 100%.
Method of Calculation:
Assuming that investors contributed $700,000 (this figure is a round-off
of $697,688), then the developer would receive$175,000 per year for four
years if the installment plan is used. Assuming that the equity actually
invested is $59,000 (See Appendix Al), this equity would be subtracted
from the first year's installment payment as the payment would be a return
on capi tal.
With a developer in the 50% tax bracket the actual benefits received
from the syndication proceeds would be half of the installment payment.
Discounting the benefits received over the four years at 100% , the discounted
return is still greater than the initial actual cash investment:
Year Payment to Sponsor After Tax Discount Benefits
Benefits Factor
1 $116,000 $58,000 .50 $29,000
2 175,000 87,500 .23 20,125
3 175,000 87,500 .14 12,250
4 175,000 87,500 .06 5,250
$320,500 66,625
(59,000)
7,625
APPENDIX B: Comparison of Methods of Depreciation
Straight Line
Year Depreciation
1
2
3
4
5
$20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
20,000
150% D. B.
Year Depreciation
1
2
3
4
5
$30,000
29,250
16,500
10,750
6,225
Cummulative
$20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
Cummula ti ve
$30,000
56,000
72,750
83,500
89,725
200% D.B.
Depreciation
$40,000
30,000
15,000
7,500
3,750
Sum of the
Years Di gi ts
$33,000
27,000
20,000
13,000
7,000
Cummulative
$40,000
70,000
85,000
92,500
96,250
Cummula ti ve
$33,000
60,000
80,000
93,000
100,000
APPENDIX C: Interviews with Sponsors of Subsidized Housing
During the course of this study, a series of interviews was conducted with
representatives of nine development firms with extensive involvement in subsidized
housing both in Boston and elsewhere in Massachusetts. (Some also had been
involved in the subsidized programs in other states in the Northeast) . Eight
of these were private, profit-oriented firms; the ninth was a non-profit
consulting firm.
The questions posed in the open-ended interviews were intended to provide
a basis for general commentary on the following five topics:
1) Extent of developer's involvement in subsidized housing ove the last
decade.
2) Experience with the development process.
3) Developer's reasons for investing in subsidized housing.
4) Financial difficulties in operation.
5) Problems in working with HUD and/or the Boston Rent Control Administration.
The following is a summary of the developer responses:
All nine developers had a good deal of experience in working with the
federally subsidized housing programs; most had become involved in the middle
of the 1960's, with two of the developers having participated since those
programs first began to be implemented in Boston in 1960. Eight of the nine worked
with an identity-of-interest building firm; only one developer participated
with an independent builder.
Six of the eight private developers stated that the tax shelter benefits
obtainable under these programs provided the chief incentive for their
investment in subsidized housing. One stated that the 6% limited dividend
was the major incentive, but that his firm utilized the depreciation as a
corporate tax shelter. The eighth said that he invested in the program
because HUD asked him to participate in the BURP plan. Two of the first six
firms also cited secondary reasons for investment, these being profit potential
in related housing services and a desire to further social progress in the
housing field.
All developers agreed that on the whole, HUD processsing of the various
steps associated with the development process was extremely slow. Some felt
that this was because of inefficientcy at the HUD area office; an equal
number felt that the office was efficient, but that the complexity of the
development process was such that faster action would be unreasonable to expect.
Eight out of the nine stated that they had encountered long time lages
in getting rent increases for their projects approve by HUD. Estimates of
time elapse between application for an increase and final approval indicated
an average of seven to nine months in the period before the moratorium on new
construction, some delays being shorter and some being exceptionally long. (One
developer cited a case where he had to wait thirteen months for approval of an
increase.) All agreed that HUD processsing of increases had become much speedier
since the moratorium, dropping to around two or three months.
All developers agreeed that slowness in HUD processsing during development
and operation of projects was in large part responsible for costly delays, both
during construction and after final closing, in the latter case seriously hamper-
ing developers trying to make up deficiencies in operating costs with new rent
increases. Developers were also unanimous in feeling that the basic financial
stability of the subsidized projects was greatly compromised because of
unrealistically low HUD limits on projected operation costs. Since
APPENDIX C (continued)
these were built into the initial applications for building multifamily projects,
it was felt that developers were therby forced to underestimate operating costs
just in order for proposals to be considred feasible.
Most agreed that the presence of rent control in subsidized housing
added to processsing delays and therby aggravated financial difficulties
caused by skyrocketing costs.
Half of the developers mentioned the city of Boston's tax formula as an
additional secondary factor causing financial difficulty. Until 1972, the city
had agreed to take 15% of gross annual income in lieu of the assessment
under normal procedures. However, in 1972, the city raised this percentage to 17%
for all subsidizied developments, including those in operation and those under
construction at that time, a move which contributed further to operating
imbalance in the Boston projects.
Seven out of the nine indicated that the class of occupants of these
developemtns also contributed somewhat to higher maintenance costs than those
of conventional housing.
All of the developers interviewed estimated a time lag of six to eight
weeks in the processing of rent increase applications by the Boston Rent Control
Board (a figure confirmed by officials in the Rent Control Administration);
beyond that, perceptions of the Rent Board's role differed radically. Three
out of eight (one developer had no experience with rent control hearings) felt
that the Rent Board was unduly biased towards the tenants as a matter of political
expediency ("they'd never grant an increase before an election.") The other
five felt that the Rnet Board was doing a fair job, given the nature of the
circumstances under which the Board was operating. Three developers felt
that the Rent Board's policy of denying increases to developments with building
code violations was both unrealistic and damaging to the financial stability of
those developments. They suggested that the Rent Board instead grant requests for
the increase and reserve the accruing extra funds to remedy all such violations.
In response to the key question of whether they would consider new
investment in FHA subsidized housing in Boston, assuming that the moratorium
on new subsidized construction was lifted and rent control retained,
developers agina expressed mixed responses. Although most thought that rent
control would be a negative factor affecting their decision to invest in the
program again, five indicated that they would continue to invest if the subsidized
programs were restored. One developer stated that his firm would not invest
in Boston again as long as rent control was in effect there; the remaining
three said that they would not invest in any type of real estate whatsoever,
whether or not the programs were restored. They expressed various
degress of dissatisfaction with the general financial climate, HUD's role in
the programs and the existenace of rent control as the major factors
influencing their decision.
